Louisiana Law Review
Volume 52
Number 6 July 1992

Article 19

7-1-1992

Judge Rubin's Maritime Tort Decisions
David W. Robertson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
David W. Robertson, Judge Rubin's Maritime Tort Decisions, 52 La. L. Rev. (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol52/iss6/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Judge Rubin's Maritime Tort Decisions
David W. Robertson*

Alvin Rubin became a federal district judge in 1966 and a member
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1977.' During his twenty-five
years of judicial service he published 1079 opinions. Slightly more than
10% of these-approximately 110 opinions-were admiralty cases. Judge
Rubin was an acknowledged master of the maritime field. Many of his

Fifth Circuit colleagues have issued statements commemorating his contributions and highlighting the importance of his work in admiralty and
maritime law.' His skill and zeal for clarification were such that he
made a positive contribution virtually every time he addressed the subject.
In this article I examine a number of Judge Rubin's district court and
court of appeals opinions addressing personal injury and other tort
subtopics.

I.
A.

THE

LAW OF SEAMAN STATUS

Background

Under American maritime law seamen have generous tort remedies,
whereas other maritime workers are generally confined to workers' compensation systems.' Particularly in regard to the men and women engaged
in the multifarious oil and gas activities of the waters and swamps of
the Fifth Circuit, 4 it is often hard to tell who is a seaman and who is
not. Judge Griffin Bell put the difficulty succinctly: "[T]he myriad
circumstances in which men go upon the water confront courts not with
Copyright 1992, by LouIsIAA LAw Ravmw.
A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas.
1. See generally David W. Robertson, Alvin Rubin's Last Dissent, 70 Tex. L. Rev.
7 (1991).
2. See Edith H. Jones, A Farewell to Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1,
2 (1991); Thomas M. Reavley, Alvin B. Rubin: Man of Splendor, 28 Hous. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Oct. 1991); Memorial Ceremony Honoring Circuit Judge Alvin B. Rubin,
June 17, 1991, 7 5th Cir. Rep. 1021, 1025 (Sep. 1991) (remarks of Judge Wisdom); id.
at 1027 (remarks of Judge Goldberg).
3. See generally David W. Robertson, The Law of Seaman Status Clarified, 23 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Robertson]; David W. Robertson, A New Approach
to Determining Seaman Status, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 79 (1985) [hereinafter A New Approach].
4. See Peter Beer, Keeping Up With The Jones Act, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 391 (1986)
(describing the many "gruesome, devastating, and bizarre" injuries suffered by workers
engaged in maritime mineral operations and referring to this phenomenon as a "litigation
gusher") [hereinafter Beern.
*
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discrete classes of maritime employees, but rather with a spectrum ranging from the blue-water seaman to the land-based longshoreman." 5
When a maritime worker is hurt under circumstances in which it is
clear that no other person or entity was at fault, the worker will probably
be better off if the legal system treats him as a non-seaman. This is
because workers' compensation benefits under either the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 6 (LHWCA) or occasionally applicable state law7 are usually more generous than the maintenance and

cure benefits due a seaman hurt through no one's fault. But if there
is any chance of establishing employer negligence or vessel unseaworthiness, the injured worker-and, equally importantly, the worker's

lawyer-will want the worker to be treated as a seaman. This is because
tort damages are almost always greater than workers' compensation
benefits. The Jones Act 9 gives injured seamen a negligence remedy against
their employers, and the burden of showing employer fault is "featherweight." 10 And if the injured worker was a member of the crew of

a vessel" that was defective in any significant particular, even momentarily, 2 the strict liability doctrine of unseaworthiness"3 provides an

5. Brown v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 497 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Guidry v.
South La. Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1980) (Judge Rubin alluding to
"the protean factual situations presented by amphibious industrial operations.").
6. 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1988).
7. See Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432 (1980) (holding
that state workers' compensation law is not preempted by the LHWCA as to injuries on
land); Logan v. Louisiana Dock Co., 541 So. 2d 182 (La.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S.
939, 110 S. Ct. 30 (1989) (state workers' compensation law not preempted for certain
injuries on water).
8. Because contingency fees on tort awards are pleasant and lawyer payments for
workers' compensation work much less so, claimants' lawyers sometimes seek seaman
status when the client would be better off under LHWCA or state workers' compensation
law. For similar reasons they sometimes pursue state workers' compensation benefits for
workers who would be better off in the LHWCA system. See Landry v. Carlson Mooring
Serv., 643 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1981)
(holding that a worker who mistakenly goes for state compensation can later get LHWCA
benefits, with a credit to the employer for the earlier state payments). 33 U.S.C. § 903(e)
(1988) has now codified the holding of Landry.
9. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
10. Allen v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 360 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1975)).
11. See Smith v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 1107 (1991) (holding that an injured seaman has no unseaworthiness
remedy against a vessel or its owner unless he was a member of that vessel's crew).
12. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926 (1960) (establishing
the doctrine of transitory unseaworthiness).
13. It is common to say that the owner of a vessel owes the members of its crew
"a warranty of seaworthiness." Rogers v. Gracey-Hellums Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1287,
1288 (E.D. La. 1970) (Rubin, J.), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1971). But cf. Meyers
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additional route to tort damages against the vessel1 4 and/or its operator.
Hence the injured worker's lawyer will be quick to claim the worker

was a seaman in any case in which there is any significant chance of
both showing employer or vessel fault and meeting the criteria for seaman

status.
Extensive maritime oil and gas operations began in the Gulf of
Mexico area shortly after World War 11.15 Soon thereafter injured maritime and amphibious oil-and-gas workers began queuing up at the6
courthouse door in substantial numbers seeking seamen's remedies.

When judges and lawyers began trying to sort the legitimate seamen
from the more land-bound of these workers, they found that the criteria

for seaman status laid down in the Supreme Court's decisions were
quite confusing. In the period from 1920 (when the Jones Act created

the seaman's negligence remedy) to 1958, the Court had decided eight
cases bearing on the problem of classifying workers as seamen vel non.17
(The most significant decision in that series, Swanson v. MarraBrothers,"s
established that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive
in their coverages such that the LHWCA term "master or member of

a crew of any vessel"'

9

defines the Jones Act term "seaman.")

0

In

1958-just when the new problems of amphibious oil and gas operations
brought the uncertainties created by the Court's seaman status decisions
into sharp focus-the Court "fell into a long silence ' 21 on the seaman

status issue. 22 The task of making sense of the law of seaman status
was left to the courts of the Fifth Circuit.

Judge John Minor Wisdom, with able assistance from Judge J.
Skelly Wright, took the task in hand. In 1958 careful study of the
results of the Supreme Court's cases led Judge Wright to the realization

v. M/V Eugenio C, 842 F.2d 815, 817 (5th Cir. 1988), modified, 876 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.
1989) ("The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is sometimes, erroneously, called a
warranty ....
) (Rubin, J.).
14. An unseaworthiness action may be brought in rem. See Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty In A Nutshell 193, 204 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Maraist]. A Jones Act suit may
not. See id.at 217.
15. See David W. Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for
Radical Simplification, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 973 (1977).
16. See Beer, supra note 4, at 390-395.
17. These cases are analyzed in A New Approach, supra note 3, at 85-93. See also
Kenneth G. Engerrand and Jeffrey R. Bale, Seaman Status Reconsidered, 24 S. Tex. L.J.
431, 448-55 (1983) [hereinafter Engerrand].
18. 328 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 869 (1946).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988).
20. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988).
21. Robertson, supra note 3, at 2.
22. After issuing its per curiam decision in Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271, 78
S. Ct. 734 (1958), the Court ignored the seaman status problem until McDermott Int'l,
Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
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that the Court's intermittent statements seeming to make navigational

duties a requisite to seaman status were "misleading.

' 23

Judge Wright

also pointed out that the Court's occasional suggestion that it was
necessary for a plaintiff seeking seaman status to show that he worked
on a vessel "in navigation" was no more than superfluous "loose
language." 24 A year later Judge Wisdom elaborated on Judge Wright's
25
theme in his celebrated opinion in Offshore Co. v. Robison:
[In the Supreme Court's seaman status cases) words have lost
their natural meaning ....
With due deference to the Supreme
Court, we attach less importance to ["navigational"] catchphrases than we do to the cases piled on cases in which recovery
is allowed when by no stretch of the imagination can it be said
that the claimant had anything to do with navigation .... 16
The Robison opinion synthesized the Supreme Court's decisions into a
test for seaman status that, with minor modifications, 2 remains the law
2
today:

[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act case to go to
the jury: (1) if there is evidence that the injured workman was
assigned permanently to a vessel (including special purpose structures not usually employed as a means of transport by water
but designed to float on water) or performed a substantial part
of his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in which he
was employed or the duties which he performed contributed to
the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mis-

23. Perez v. Marine Transp. Lines, 160 F. Supp. 853, 855 (E.D. La. 1958). The
Supreme Court's recent decision in McDermott, Ill S. Ct. 807, confirmed Judge Wright's
insight by holding that navigational duties are not required for seaman status and explicitly
stating that the Court's earlier expressions to the contrary were "befuddling" language
that "the time has come to jettison." Ill S. Ct. at 816.
24. Perez, 160 F. Supp. at 855.
25. 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
26. Id. at 780.
27. The two significant modifications that have occurred are discussed infra at notes
30-32 and 86-93. In brief, Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523 (5th
Cir. 1960), modified Robison by adding that a worker can qualify as a seaman by having
the described connection with an "identifiable fleet of vessels" as well as with a single
vessel. Id. at 528. Much later Barrett v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir.
1986) (en banc), further modified the Robison test by requiring that the described connection with a vessel or fleet have existed during the injured worker's entire period of
employment with his current employer.
28. In its recent decision in McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991),
the Court unanimously "endorsed" the Robison approach. Palmer v. Fayard Moving and
Transp. Corp., 930 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Robert G. Pugh, Jr., An
Interview With The Honorable John Minor Wisdom, 39 La. B.J. 254, 258 (1991) (Wilander
"approved" Robison) (quoting Judge Wisdom).

19921

IN MEMORIAM: ALVIN B. RUBIN

sion, or to the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms of
its maintenance during its movement or during anchorage for
its future trips. 9
The most significant modification of the Robison test occurred only a
year later, with the issuance of Judge John R. Brown's opinion for a
divided panel in Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc.,a upholding
seaman status on behalf of a man whose principal work was maintaining
and repairing several ferries operated by his employer. The man's work
regularly took him aboard ferries in operation on the busy Mississippi
River at New Orleans and therefore significantly exposed him to the
dangers presented by work on and around vessels in motion on navigable
water. Yet he lacked the requisite work connection with a single identifiable vessel. Judge Brown's opinion emphasized those features of the
man's work 3 that regularly exposed him to vessel-movement dangers
and concluded:
The usual thing, of course, is for a person to have a Jones Act
seaman status in relation to a particular vessel. But there is
nothing about this expanding concept to limit it mechanically
to a single ship. If the other [Robison] factors ... are ...
present, we see no insurmountable difficulty [in recognizing seaman status on the basis of a work connection with] an identifiable fleet of vessels .... 31
Note that Robison lays down two criteria for seaman status. 33 The
second criterion of the Robison test-requiring the worker to show that

29. Robison, 266 F.2d at 779.
30. 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1960).
31. See id. at 525-26 ("Repair and overhaul work was often done on ferries while
actually operating"); id. at 527 ("[H]e board[ed] each of the ferries every morning....
[Miuch of the ... repair or maintenance work ... was accomplished without ever
withdrawing the ferry from service. Braniff ... would remain aboard, and while the
ferry was still in her regular operation going to and from landing to landing, the work
would be done. Indeed, it was just such work as was being performed at the time of
the accidental drowning ....
The ferry continued to move or drift in the river and the
capsizing occurred"); id. at 528 ("doing maintenance and repair work while the ferries
continued to operate").
32. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
33. In Legros v. Panther Servs. Group, Inc., 863 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1988),
reh'g granted (1989) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 874 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1989), Judge
Rubin referred to "the two-part test used in this circuit since Offshore Company v.
Robison." See also New v. Associated Painting Servs., Inc., 863 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1989) (Rubin, J., describing two-part test). However, in several earlier opinions Judge
Rubin had set forth three-part tests differing to some degree from the Robison opinion
and from each other. See Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 630
(E.D. La. 1975) ("threefold test" consisting of vessel in navigation, "navigational" duties,
and more or less permanent connection with vessel); Guidry v. South La. Contractors,
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his duties or work contributed to the vessel's (or fleet's) function,
4
mission, operation, or welfare-is by its nature rather easily satisfied.
The recurrent question in seaman status cases has, been the proper
application of Robison's first criterion, requiring a showing of permanent
assignment to or substantial work on a vessel or identifiable fleet. Note
that permanent assignment and substantial work are alternative grounds;
either will satisfy the criterion. 5 Indeed the courts often collapse the
36
two into a "more or less permanent connection" standard.
B.

Porche, Wallace, "A New Approach," and Wilander

In the three decades since Robison was decided the federal courts,
especially those of the Fifth Circuit, have decided hundreds of seaman
status cases.37 In virtually all of them the contested question has been
whether the plaintiff could show the performance of enough work aboard
a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels to satisfy Robison's "more or
less permanent connection" standard. Obviously the criterion is not selfenforcing. In close cases the vessel-connection question cannot be answered without reference to the policy underlying the seamen's protections. Judge Wisdom's Robison opinion was careful to explain that fact,
eloquently noting the necessity for courts to keep their doctrinal devices
aligned with the general policies the doctrine is designed to implement:
Expansion of the terms "seaman" and "vessel" are consistent
with the liberal construction of the [Jones] Act that has characterized it from the beginning and is consistent with its purposes. Within broad limits of what is reasonable, Congress has
seen fit to allow juries to decide who are seamen under the
Jones Act. There is nothing in the act to indicate that Congress

Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980) (listing three elements-more or less permanent
connection, vessel in navigation, and contribution to function or mission of vessel);
Munguia v. Chevron Co., USA, Inc., 768 F.2d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1050, 106 S. Ct. 1272 (1986) ("three-fold" test-substantial work, more or less
permanent assignment, and contribution to function or mission of vessel). Only the
Munguia variance is significant. In stating that a, seaman must show both substantial
work aboard the vessel and a more or less permanent assignment to the vessel, Judge
Rubin's Munguia opinion was not faithful to the meaning of Robison, which set up these
two elements as alternatives. See Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 326 (5th
Cir. 1977) (explicitly recognizing that permanent assignment and substantial work are
alternative criteria). See also Wallace v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir.
1984) (same); Bertrand v. Int'l Mooring & Marine, Inc., 700 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 974 (1984) (same).
34. See the discussion and authorities in A New Approach, supra note 3, at 96-97.
35. See supra note 33.
36. Guidry v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. See A New Approach, supra note 3; Engerrand, supra note 17.
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intended the law to apply only to conventional members of a
ship's company. The absence of any legislative restriction has
enabled the law to develop naturally along with the development
of unconventional vessels, such as the strange-looking specialized
watercraft designed for oil operations offshore and in the shallow
coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Many of the Jones Act
seamen on these vessels share the same marine risks to which
all aboard are subject. And in many instances Jones Act seamen
are exposed to more hazards than are blue-water sailors. They
run the risk of top-heavy drilling barges collapsing. They run
all the risks incident to oil drilling.3"
Later decisions and scholars have reiterated the policy theme: "Exposure
to the 'perils of the sea' and to risks attending the movement of vessels
on navigable water are the distinguishing characteristics of a seaman's
work." '39 "In applying the permanency and substantiality requirement
in ambiguous cases, [courts'] analysis again and again has focused on
•.. the degree of exposure to the hazards or perils of the sea . . .,40
But sometimes courts forget or ignore the policy. 4' When that happens
the result is sterile wordplay. 42 Terms like "permanent assignment" and
"substantial work" have no intrinsic meaning and no resolving power.
To the extent that courts cling to them as a doctrinal substitute for
careful thought about the underlying policy of the seamen's protections,
Gilmore and Black's characterization of the seaman status jurisprudence
as "depressing ' 4a will remain apt. But when courts do tie the seaman
status doctrine laid down in Robison to the appropriate policy, the
doctrine does the job it was designed to do. 44
Toward the end of his tenure on the district bench Judge Rubin
made a distinctive contribution to the proper policy-based application

38. Offshore Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959).
39. A New Approach, supra note 3, at 80.
40. Wallace v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427, 434 (5th Cir. 1984).
41. See, e.g., the Bach decision, discussed infra at notes 126-134. See also A New
Approach, supra note 3, at 83-84, 92, 99, 104, 106-07.
42. Engerrand, supra note 17, is critical of the courts for engaging in sterile doctrinal
exercises: "[I]n determining whether a worker is a member of a crew, his relation to the
vessel is frequently ignored in favor of a numbers game involving time spent by the
claimant on the vessel." 24 S. Tex. L.J. at 483. But elsewhere this article itself seems
to engage in similar wordplay: "[T]he permanent assignment element has been reduced
to being 'substantial' [and] the substantial work element has been modified to incorporate
concepts of a permanent assignment." Id. at 481.
43. Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 328 (2d ed.

1975).
44. Calling for more explicit judicial attention to the policy that underlies the Jones
Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine is a central theme of A New Approach, supra note
3. It is also one of the lessons of McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807
(1991). See generally Robertson, supra note 3.
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of the Robison doctrine. Porchev. Gulf MississippiMarine Corporation445
was Rubin's first reported decision examining the seaman status issue. 6
Gerald Porche was hired as a temporary replacement for a welder on
an offshore pipelay barge. On what was to have been his first day on
the job, Porche was paid an hourly wage while riding a crew boat from
the dock out to the barge. But he never got the chance to perform any

actual work for his new employer; in a tragic accident he was killed
being transferred from the crew boat to the barge. Judge Rubin directed
a verdict that Porche was a Jones Act seaman. 47 "Mr. Porche became
a seaman before he put his foot on the deck of the barge." ' 4 Specifically

addressing the application of the Robison "more or less permanent
connection" criterion to Porche's situation, Judge Rubin emphasized
that the young man was assigned to the pipelay barge "for an indefinite

period of time-until the regular welder was able to return"4 9-and

explained that the Robison criteria must be applied in light of the
underlying policy they were designed to serve:

The requirement of a relatively permanent tie to the vessel is
meant to deny seaman's status to those who come aboard a

vessel for an isolated piece of work, not to deprive a person
whose duties are truly navigational of Jones Act rights merely
because he serves aboard a vessel for only a relatively short
period of time. 5

Judge Rubin's insight has proved a perennially useful antidote to
the tendency of many lawyers and some judges to take a woodenly
doctrinal approach to the seaman status issue. It has been quoted ap-

45. 390 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1975).
46. In Franks v. Land and Marine Applicators, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. La.
1972), Judge Rubin had granted summary judgment dismissing the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims of a worker whose only connection with vessels had been helping
to build a new one. It has long been settled that new vessels under construction do not
qualify as Jones Act vessels. The Franks opinion correctly treated the seaman status issue
as completely obvious.
47. The Porche decision is a leading authority for the propriety of directed verdicts
in plaintiffs' favor on the seaman status issue in clear cases. See Landry v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 595 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Porche, inter alia, in support of holding
that trial judge should have directed a verdict that a female roustabout who spent 70%
of her work time in vessel-related activities on a small number of barges operated by her
employer was a seaman).
48. Porche, 390 F. Supp. at 631.
49. Id.
50. Earlier in the opinion Judge Rubin had explained that "navigational" in this
context meant "hav[ing] a connection with the mission or the function of the floatable
" Id.
I. (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 780 (5th Cir. 1959)).
structure.
See also supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
51. Porche, 390 F. Supp. at 631.
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provingly in a number of decisions by courts in at least three of the
federal circuits." In his important opinion in Wallace v. Oceaneering
International" Judge Brown extolled Judge Rubin's Porche opinion as
a leading example of the appropriate use of policy considerations in
applying the Jones Act, stating that the passage quoted above "brought
to the surface a principle that had been submerged in a large body of
murky case law."5 4 Judge Brown's phrasing of the principle was this:
"In applying the permanency and substantiality requirement in ambiguous cases, our analysis again and again has focused on (1) the degree
of [the worker's] exposure to the hazards or perils of the sea,
and (2)
55
the maritime or terra firma nature of the worker's duties."
The Supreme Court's recent decision in McDermott International,
Inc. v. Wilander 6-the Court's first look at the seaman status issue
since the "long silence"" began in 1958-was not directly concerned
with the meaning of the "more or less permanent connection" criterion
but rather with whether Judge Wisdom had been correct in Robison
when he translated the Supreme Court's "aid of navigation" phrases
into the requirement that a seaman must contribute to the vessel's
purpose, function, or mission. In the course of unanimously approving"
that aspect of Robison-holding that "the time has come to jettison
the aid in navigation language" 59-the Court gave an important statement
of the policy that underlies the seamen's protections:
Traditional seamen's remedies ... have been "universally recognized as ... growing out of the status of the seaman and
his peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a feature of the
maritime law compensating or offsetting the special hazards and
disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in ships are

52. See Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 n.7 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985); Prinzi v. Keydril Co., 738
F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir. 1984); Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736 F.2d 307,
310 (5th Cir. 1984); White v. Valley Line Co., 736 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1984); Wallace
v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1984); Bertrand v. Int'l Mooring &
Marine, Inc., 700 F.2d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct.
974 (1984); Reecer v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 745 F. Supp. 485, 491 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
53. 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 434.
55. Id.
56. 111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
57. See supra note 21.
58. See Wilander, Ill S. Ct. at 817 ("[Robison] correctly determined that ... this

Court was no longer requiring that seamen aid in navigation ....
[Wie believe the
requirement that an employee's duties must 'contributie] to the function of the vessel or
the accomplishment of its mission' captures well an important requirement of seaman
status."). See also supra note 28.

59. Id. at 816.
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subjected." ...
... All who work at sea in the service of a ship face those
particular perils to which the protection of maritime law, statutory as well as decisional, is directed. See generally Robertson,
A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status, 64 Texas L.Rev.
79 (1985). 60
To one familiar with the evolution of seaman status law the quoted
passage is a strong endorsement of the policy approach exemplified by
the work of Judges Rubin and Brown. In brief, the evolution was as
follows. First, bringing "to the surface a principle that had been submerged in a large body of murky case law," ' 6 1 Judge Rubin's Porche
opinion set forth an essential policy guideline for the application of
seaman status doctrine: The "more or less permanent connection" doctrine must not be applied literally or woodenly but rather with a sensitive
eye to the actual realities of the injured worker's situation.6 2 Second,
relying centrally on Porche, Judge Brown's Wallace opinion amplified
the importance of focusing on the worker's "degree of exposure to the
hazards or perils of the sea.''63 Third, building on the Wallace case,
the law review article "A New Approach" urged an even more heightened

60. Id. at 817 (citations omitted). The internal quotation is from Chief Justice Stone's
dissent in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104, 66 S.Ct. 872, 882 (1946).
The closing reference is to A New Approach, supra note 3.
61. Wallace, 727 F.2d at 434.
62. Some of the language in Judge Rubin's later opinion in Munguia v. Chevron
Co., USA, Inc., 768 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct.
1272 (1986), is facially inconsistent with his approach in Porche. Munguia upheld a
judgment n.o.v. denying seaman status to a worker who used small boats to travel to
his work on fixed platforms located in navigable water. Judge Rubin stated: "The jury
might have found that, as contended by Munguia, his work required the ability to pilot
a small boat and 'more than rudimentary' knowledge of the operation and maintenance
of the craft; that he had to know about currents in the river to navigate properly; and
that he faced the vicissitudes of storm, injury, and death while on the waters he travelled.
But these are not the specific criteria by which it is determined that a worker is a member
of the crew of a vessel." Id. at 652. The suggestion that exposure to nautical dangers
is beside the point is at odds with the philosophy of Porche. But the Munguia result is
explicable as part of a line of cases denying seaman status to fixed platform workers
whose only connection with boats was riding them to work. See A New Approach, supra
note 3, at 105-06. See also Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291,
295 (5th Cir. 1987) (being "a passenger on his way to and from [fixed] platforms ...
[does] not qualify [a worker] as a Jones Act seaman") (Rubin, J.). In Munguia Judge
Rubin went on to characterize any work plaintiff had done on the small boats as incidental:
"[H]is primary duties were neither to pilot nor to maintain the boats nor to use them
as a place of work. He used them only as a means of getting to and from his work on
platforms.... [W]ater travel alone does not make a worker a crew member." Munguia,
768 F.2d at 653. For further discussion of the questionable aspects of Munguia, see supra
note 33 and infra note 94.
63. Wallace, 727 F.2d at 434.
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and explicit judicial focus on the dangers to which particular workers
are exposed:
Taking Wallace as a synthesis of the entire Robison line of
cases .... a worker [should] be a seaman (1) when a substantial
part of his duties are performed on vessels, and (2) [when] his
work regularly or significantly exposes him to the perils of the
sea or to dangers attending the movement of vessels on navigable
water. "4
Finally, the Supreme Court in Wilander spelled out its view that workers
who confront the "particular perils" characteristic of seamen's duties
should be protected by the seamen's doctrines, citing "A New Ap-

proach. "6
In deciding to "jettison the aid in navigation language" 66 the Wilander Court agreeably simplified and clarified the law of seaman status.
By adding explicit recognition of the important policy of protecting
workers who confront the "particular perils" characteristic of seamen's
work, the Court both added further clarification and potentially liberalized the application of the seamen's remedies. 67 In light of these features
of Wilander it is hard to understand Eileen Madrid's recent claim in
the pages of this journal that "the decision represents a different analytical approach to seaman status than the oft-cited maxim that the
Jones Act is remedial legislation which should be liberally construed....
[T]he [Wilander] ruling rests entirely on statutory construction and legislative intent rather than on jurisprudential policy considerations.'6 On
the contrary, we have just seen that Wilander rests in major part on
recognition of the policy viewpoint that "A New Approach" took from
Judge Brown's opinion in Wallace and that Judge Brown in turn took
69
from Judge Rubin's decision in Porche.

64. A New Approach, supra note 3, at 120 (footnotes omitted).
65. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, III S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991).
66. Id. at 816.
67. See generally Robertson, supra note 3.
68. Eileen R. Madrid, Seaman Status: The Supreme Court Recharts Its Course:
Wilander and Gizoni, 51 La. L. Rev. 1149, 1152-53 (1991).
69. In addition to its importance in the law of seaman status the Porche decision is
also widely cited for its strong stance against blindfolding the jury. (See Leon Green,
Blindfolding the Jury, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 273 (1955).) During its deliberations, the Porche
jury sent Judge Rubin a written question: "In the event we award the plaintiffs the sum
of $100,000[,] [does that mean they receive this amount or a portion of this value?"
Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975). Judge Rubin
answered that in light of the finding of 450 contributory fault against Gerald Porche,
an award of $100,000 would mean the plaintiffs would receive $55,000. In his Porche
opinion Judge Rubin explained why he thought answering the question was proper: "There
is some authority that, when a judge requires a jury to return a special verdict .. . the
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C. Barrett, Pizzitolo, Legros, and Gizoni
In the early 1980s a growing number of judges and commentators
began urging that the Robison approach was admitting far too many
workers to the coveted status of legal seamen.70 As that viewpoint began
colliding with the Robison approach in the cases, four areas of instability
developed in the law of seaman status. The first was the resurrected
argument that a worker must have navigational duties in order to be
a seaman. 7 ' As we have seen, that specific matter was laid to rest in
Wilander. However, some of the Fifth Circuit decisions leading up to
Wilander remain relevant oi related issues and will be treated in this
began restricting the categories of
subsection. Second, some decisions
''special purpose structures'' 72 and "strange-looking specialized
watercraft ' 7 that can qualify as vessels under the Robison approach to
7
determining seaman status. 74 That story is still unfolding s and will not

jury should not be informed of the legal consequences of their answers. But the better
view is that a jury is entitled to know what effect its decision will have. The jury is not
to be set loose in a maze of factual questions, to be answered without intelligent awareness
of the consequences. One of the purposes of the jury system is to temper the strict
application of law to facts, and thus bring to the administration of justice a commonsense lay approach, a purpose ill-served by relegating the jury to a role of determining
facts in vacuo, ignorant of the significance of their findings." Id.; citations omitted. This
portion of Porche has been widely cited. See, e.g., Turlington v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
795 F.2d 434, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1986); Vinieris v. Byzantine Maritime Corp., 731 F.2d
1061, 1065 (2d Cir. 1984); Martin v. Texaco, Inc., 726 F.2d 207, 216 (5th Cir. 1984);
Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 395 (Haw. 1986); Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 689 (Idaho
1978); Thurston v. Ballou, 505 N.E.2d 888, 891 (Mass. App. 1987); Roman v. Mitchell,
413 A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1980); Schabe v. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 480
N.Y.S.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Peair v. Home Ass'n of Enola Legion No.
751, 430 A.2d 665, 671 (Pa. Super. 1981); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881, 882 (W.
Va. 1982).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. John F. Beasley Const. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1062 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985) (Robison too liberal now that
LHWCA coverage has expanded and LHWCA benefits have increased); Barrett v. Chevron,
USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1076 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (concurring opinion of Judges
Gee, Jolly, Hill, and Jones, expressing agreement with Johnson); Barrett v. Chevron,
USA, Inc., 752 F.2d 129, 137 (5th Cir. 1985) (panel) (Judge Jolly, dissenting, deploring
"stretch[ing] words and logic beyond their reasonable ductility in the name of 'liberal
construction"'); Beer, supra note 4, at 379 n.t (Jones Act jurisprudence so liberal that
it has "held the law up to ridicule"); id. at 396 (Robison criticized as a "cosmetic
apology"); id. at 398 (Robison "a classic example of .. .eager judicial legislation"); id.
at 414 ("current judicial definitions of seaman's status are a travesty that have tarnished
the very forums in which the Jones Act is sought to be enforced"); Engerrand, supra
note 17 (passim).
71. See generally Robertson, supra note 3, at 4-11.
72. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
73. Id. at 780.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
75. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 11-16.
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be examined here.76 Third, a movement developed to narrow the "identifiable fleet" concept" so as to exclude workers like harbor and river

pilots from the seamen's remedies.7 8 Fourth, some members of the Fifth
Circuit became committed to what has been called "the Pizzitolo her-

esy." 79 In this subsection we will address the developments that set the
stage for Wilander, the recent "fleet" cases, and the rise and fall of
Pizzitolo.
1.

Rejecting the Aid-of-Navigation Requirement

As indicated above, the language (but not the results) of the Supreme

Court's seaman status decisions prior to Wilander supported the argument that a worker must have navigational duties in order to be classified
as a seaman. In 1979 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that to achieve seaman status "a maritime worker who does not actually
go to sea ... must establish that he performed significant navigational

functions."

0

Five years later the Seventh Circuit decided that seaman

status required a showing that "the person injured made a significant
contribution to the ... transportation function of the vessel.''8 These
two decisions provided powerful ammunition for the Fifth Circuit judges
and lawyers who were eager to see the aid-of-navigation test adopted
in replacement of Robison's "contribution to vessel's function or mis-

sion" standard.
After a divided panel awarded seaman status to an offshore welder
in Barrettv. Chevron, USA ,a2the Fifth Circuit granted en banc rehearing
and specifically directed counsel to brief and argue the aid-of-navigation

76. Judge Rubin wrote two important opinions on the issue of defining "vessels"
for Jones Act purposes. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983), held that a helicopter pilot is not a
seaman-i.e., not a "member of a crew of any vessel"-because a helicopter is not a
vessel. Ward v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983), held that the survivors of the
pilot of a fish spotter airplane were entitled to benefits under the LHWCA because an
airplane is not a vessel. In his dissent in Barger Judge Brown claimed that Judge Rubin's
opinion in Guidry v. South La. Contractors, 614 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1980), had treated
the "elevated boom of a large dragline" as a vessel. Barger, 692 F.2d at 342 n.3 (Brown,
J., dissenting). The claim is fanciful; the vessel that sufficed for seaman status in Guidry
was "a barge that carried a large dragline." Guidry, 614 F.2d at 450.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
78. See generally Robertson, supra note 3,at 16-22.
79. Id.at 22.
80. Simko v. C & C Marine Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960, 965 (3d "Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S. Ct. 64 (1979).
81. Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1063 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985).
82. 752 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
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issue.8 3 The en banc court eventually reversed the panel decision by a
vote of eight to six. 4 Four judges who joined in the majority opinion
would have adopted the aid-of-navigation requirement.15 The other four
members of the majority 6 approved the basic thrust of Robison but
narrowed the coverage of the Jones Act somewhat by requiring most
workers8 7 seeking searmian status to satisfy the Robison criteria during
an entire period of employment with the current employer. 8 Joined by
five other judges, 9 Judge Rubin wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion in
Barrett.9° He objected to the en banc majority's narrowing of Jones
Act coverage as a "profound change in the rights of offshore maritime
workers,''91 defended the Robison criteria, and stressed the importance
of the affected worker's exposure "to the perils of the sea" 92 as well
as "the nature of his duties during [his assignment to a vessel] and the
relationship of those duties to the mission of the vessel." 93
Judge Rubin's Barrett dissent is cut from the same cloth as his
opinion in Porche.94 I should emphasize that in neither opinion was
Judge Rubin calling for abandoning doctrinal controls on access to
seaman status. When the Robison criteria could not honestly be construed

83. The Fifth Circuit Clerk wrote to Barrett counsel soliciting amicus briefs from
the Louisiana Association of Defense Counsel and the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association
and directing specific attention to the following questions: "What, if anything, should be
done to reduce the uncertainties that have evolved from the application, of some portions
of the Offshore v. Robison test? Consider the following areas in addition to any others
that you may wish to include: (1)How can 'permanent', in the 'more or less permanent'
attachment to a vessel or fleet of vessels prong of the test, be given more substance? (2)
Should we reconsider the definition of 'fleet of vessels' in the same prong of the test?
(3) Can the definition of 'substantial portion of his work on the vessel' prong of the
test be given more substance and content?" Letter from G. Ganucheau, Clerk of the
Fifth Circuit, to All Counsel of Record, Barrett v. Chevron (April 9, 1985) (copy on file
with the author). In response to the court's solicitation of amicus briefs, I filed one on
my own behalf, arguing against the aid-of-navigation requirement.
84. Barrett v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
85. See id. at 1076 (Judges Gee, Jolly, Hill, and Jones concurring).
86. Judges Davis, Clark, Higginbotham, and Randall.
87. The requirement need not be met if "the employee's permanent job assignment
during his term of employment has changed." Id. at 1075.
88. Id.
89. Judges Reavley, Politz, Tate, Johnson, and Williams. Because Fifth Circuit judges
on senior status do not participate in en banc decisions unless they were members of the
panel, neither Judge Wisdom nor Judge Brown participated in Barrett. Had they done
so, probably Judge Rubin's dissenting opinion would have been the majority opinion.
90. Id. at 1076-79.
91. Id.at 1076.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 1077.
94. See supra note 45. Itmakes the troublesome portion of his Munguia opinion
even more puzzling. See supra note 62.
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to admit a worker to seaman status, Judge Rubin would readily hold
that the worker was confined to the LHWCA remedies regardless of
exposure to perils of the sea. Thus, he held that neither fish spotter
airplane pilots 9 nor the pilots of the helicopters that have replaced crew
boats in many places" were seamen. Similarly, he would not treat as
a seaman a worker who sandblasted and painted a "conglomeration''
of vessels and stationary offshore platforms but who could not demonstrate an adequate connection with any one vessel or with anything
Judge Rubin could bring himself to call a fleet. What Judge Rubin
opposed was not doctrinal controls but "inflexible" 98 doctrinal controls.
In his view the Barrett majority's new rule requiring a more or less
permanent connection with a vessel or fleet during the worker's entire
period of employment with the current employer was both "inflexible
and contrary to the rationale underlying Robison."" Of course, the aidof-navigation test favored by some members of the court would have
been even more of an inflexible departure from the Robisoni approach.
As indicated above, only four members of the Barrett en-banc court
favored the aid-of-navigation test; ten judges (Judge Rubin and the other
five dissenters, together with four of the eight judges who made up the
Barrett majority) opposed it. But despite the lopsidedness of the vote,
Barrett did not put the aid-of-navigation debate to rest. In Barrettitself,
Judge Gee-writing for the judges who wanted to adopt the aid-ofnavigation requirement-stressed the conflict between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits and the division within the Fifth Circuit in such a way
as seemingly to call on the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the
issue. ' ° Three years later the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc
in Legros v. Panther Services Group'0 1-a decision in which the panel
had not even remotely touched on the aid-of-navigation issue-and again
directed counsel to brief the issue "whether this circuit should adopt a
navigational-function test of seaman status in addition to or substitution
for the Robison standard."'0 Legros was compromised and settled by
the parties before the court issued an en banc decision. Finally, Judge

95. See Ward v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983).
96. See Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983).
97. New v. Associated Painting Servs., Inc., 863 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1989).
98. Barrett v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1077 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(Rubin, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1076.
101. 863 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, (1989) (en banc), appeal dismissed,
874 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1989).
102. 863 F.2d at 355. I filed an amicus brief on my own behalf, arguing against the
aid-of-navigation test.
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Gee wrote the panel opinion in the Wilander case-upholding seaman
status-in such a way as to reemphasize the inter-circuit and intra-circuit
conflict on the aid-of-navigation issue; he all but explicitly called on
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reverse his decision. 03 As we
have seen, the Court heeded the call for certiorari but took a dim view
of the Seventh Circuit approach Judge Gee had been extolling. Instead,
the Court unanimously affirmed the Robison approach and endorsed
the views of judges like Rubin who, in his Barrett dissent as in Porche,
had argued for the wisdom of keeping the seaman status doctrine flexible
enough to reflect the realities of the affected workers' exposure to
nautical dangers.
2.

The "Fleet"

Cases

The principal function of the body of seaman status doctrine developed by the courts is to draw the "unavoidably' °4 fairly delicate line
between Jones Act seamen-vessel workers whose duties expose them
to the characteristic seamen's dangers-and LHWCA workers-landbased workers like longshoremen whose duties involve vessels but who
do not have a significant exposure to vessel-movement dangers or to
the perils of the sea."'0 5 Obviously drawing that line became trickier
after the Braniff decision expanded Robison to allow seaman status on
the basis of a sufficient work-connection with an "identifiable fleet"
of vessels.'06 But for more than two decades the courts managed well
enough, through insistence that an "identifiable fleet" had to be defined
0 7
as a finite group of vessels under "common ownership or control."'
The "common ownership or control" requirement served to keep traditional longshoremen and similarly situated workers-workers whose
duties typically take them aboard large numbers of vessels for short
periods of work-from routinely claiming seaman status.
The identifiable fleet concept became seriously controversial in 1983,
when a Fifth Circuit panel handed down its decision in Bertrand v.
International Mooring & Marine, Inc. 08 The four plaintiffs were an
anchor-handling crew, specialists in handling the heavy anchors and
facilitating the movement of offshore drilling barges. They performed

103. See Wilander v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd,
111 S. Ct. 807 (1991).
104. See supra text accompanying note 5.
105. Robertson, supra note 3, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. See also A New Approach, supra note
3,at 97-99, 109-12.
107. Bertrand v. International Mooring & Marine, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 342, 347 (W.D.
La. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct.
974 (1984).
108. 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 974 (1984).
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all of their work on specially equipped work boats at sea and were
"continuously subjected to the perils of the sea like blue water seamen
and [were] engaged in classical seaman's work."' 9 Despite the workers'
continual exposure to the characteristic seamen's dangers, the trial judge
granted summary judgment denying seaman status because the workers
could not show a Robison connection with a single identifiable vessel" 0
nor with an identifiable fleet of vessels. The work boats that the anchor
handlers always used to do their work were not under "common ownership or control" because the handlers' employer did not own or charter
any workboats; instead their employer required the operator of each
drilling barge it contracted with to furnish a properly equipped work
boat for the particular job. The plaintiffs had worked on approximately
twenty-five different vessels during the year before the accident.",
Reversing and holding that a jury could properly find that the
Bertrand plaintiffs were seamen, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly emphasized
that the workers were "continuously subjected to the perils of the sea
like blue water seamen.""' In light of that overwhelmingly powerful
fact, the "Bertrand result seems unassailable."" 3 But the court's reasoning created problems. No one was quite sure what the Bertrand
decision had done to the "identifiable fleet" concept." 4 Three years
after Bertrand was handed down the en banc Fifth Circuit convened in
Barrett to consider "[w]hat, if anything, should be done to reduce the
uncertainties that have evolved from the application of some portions
of the Offshore [Co.] v. Robison test.""' Bertrand was easily the most
controversial of the recent liberal applications of Robison," 6 so that it
was quite surprising that the Barrett majority ultimately decided to
sidestep the Bertrand problem. The Barrett majority reiterated the significance of the old "common ownership or control" requirement:
By fleet we mean an identifiable group of vessels acting together
or under one control. We reject the notion that fleet of vessels
in this context means any group of vessels an employee happens
to work aboard. Unless fleet is given its ordinary meaning, the

109. Bertrand, 517 F. Supp. at 348.
110. See the explanation in A New Approach, supra note 3, at 109 & n.170.
111. See Bertrand, 517 F. Supp. at 346.
112. Bertrand, 700 F.2d at 240, 245 (quoting the trial judge, 517 F. Supp. at 348).
113. A New Approach, supra note 3, at 110. It should be acknowledged that the
author of A New Approach had earlier been lead appellate counsel for the Bertrand
plaintiffs.
114. Compare A New Approach, supra note 3, at 107-12, with Engerrand, supra note
17, at 489-90. See also Robertson, supra note 3, at 18-19.
115. See supra note 83.
116. See supra note 114. See also Buras v. Commercial Testing & Eng'g Co., 736
F.2d 307, 311 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984).
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fundamental distinction between members of a crew and transitory maritime workers such as longshoremen is totally obliterated. 117
Of course, Bertrand was causing a problem precisely because it seemed
to have based seaman status on the anchor handlers' connection with
a "fleet" that was not "acting together or under one control." The
Barrett majority alluded to that problem but did nothing to solve it:
We do not decide whether the same principle governs the crewmember status of the maritime worker who spends virtually all
of his time performing traditional seaman's duties-work closely
related to the movement of vessels-but does his work on short
voyages aboard a large number of vessels. [Citing Bertrand.]
Bertrand and his fellow anchor handlers are good examples of
this type worker." 8
Judge Rubin's dissenting opinion in Barrett did not sidestep the Bertrand problem. Judge Rubin began by reiterating the theme he had
sounded in Porche:"19 The vessel-connection or fleet-connection requirement must be applied flexibly, taking into account the particular worker's
20
exposure to the "perils of the sea"' as well as "the transitory duration
or fixed term of the [worker's] assignment [to a vessel], the nature of
his duties during it, and the relationship of those duties to the mission
of the vessel.' 2' In his view an appropriate balancing of those considerations validated the Bertrand decision and indicated the correct result
in similar cases:
Thus a fact finder might find that an anchor handler who is
assigned to work on a specific vessel for a period of days is a
crew member during that assignment. A worker may also be
assigned to work as a crew member for a series of voyages of
limited duration. A fact finder might, therefore, find that a
person working as a pilot on a series of short voyages is a crew
member on one or more voyages. An assignment to work as a
crew member, like the voyage of a vessel, may be brief, and
the Robison test is applicable 22in deciding the worker's status
during any such employment.
We have seen that the Supreme Court's Wilander decision endorses 23a
doctrine.
similar policy-oriented approach to applying seaman status

117.

Barrett v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).

118. Id.at 1075 n.13.
119. See supra note 45.

120. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1076.
121.

Id.at 1077.

122.
123.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-69.
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The portion of the Wilander opinion identifying exposure to "the special
hazards" and "particular perils" characteristic of seamen's work as the
policy touchstone of "the protection of maritime law, statutory as well
as decisional" 124 implies agreement with the policy views of Judge Rubin.
That portion of Wilander also suggests that the Court would agree with
Judge Rubin that the Bertrandanchor handlers-"continuously subjected
to the perils of the sea like blue water seamen and ... engaged in
classical seaman's work" 125-were properly characterized as Jones Act
seamen.
The Wilander Court's statement of Jones Act policy also suggests
that Judge Rubin's Barrett dissent was right in stating that pilots should
be treated as seamen. On that view the recent Fifth Circuit decision in
Bach v. Trident Steamship Co. 126 is a startling phenomenon. In Bach
a divided panel-Judge Brown vigorously dissenting-held that a Mississippi River pilot lacked seaman status because the many vessels he
piloted were not an "identifiable group of vessels acting together or
under one control."12 The original panel opinion in Bach-issued before
the Supreme Court's Wilander decision-does not explicitly mention
Bertrand, 28 but the effect of Bach is to overrule Bertrand or at least
to limit it narrowly to its particular facts. 29 Even more surprising was
the Bach court's casual treatment of the dangerous nautical realities of
a pilot's work. The court began by acknowledging that a marine pilot
regularly confronts the characteristic seamen's dangers:
Bach's case for seaman status has considerable intuitive appeal
for two reasons: (i) his entire job was to perform an archetypical
seaman function, the steering of an oceangoing vessel through
navigable waters; and (ii) in performing his job, Bach regularly

124. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 111 S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991).
125. Bertrand v. International Mooring & Marine, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 342, 348 (W.D.
La. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct.
974 (1984).
126. 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2253, opinion after
remand 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1996 (1992).
127. Bach, 920 F.2d at 324 (quoting Barrett v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067,
1074 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
128. The Bach opinion quotes the first sentence of the Barrett footnote that explicitly

questions whether the Barrett "principle governs the crewmember status of the maritime
worker who spends virtually all of his time performing traditional seaman's duties-work
closely related to the movement of vessels-but does his work on short voyages aboard
a large number of vessels." 920 F.2d at 324 (quoting Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1075 n.13).
The second sentence of the Barrett footnote had identified Bertrand as the source of the
puzzle. Note that Judge Eugene Davis authored both the majority Barrett opinion and
the opinion in Bach.
129.

See Folse v. Western Atlas Int'l, Inc., 580 So. 2d 482, 484 (La. App. 4th Cir.

1991), rev'd on other grounds, 593 So. 2d 341 (La. 1992).
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faced many of the hazards of life on the sea and the risks
created by moving vessels through navigable waters.'30
But, said the court, that was not good enough: "Although some of our
seaman status cases discuss the perils of the sea that the worker faces,
we have never held that seaman status is coextensive with exposure to
seamen's risks."' 1 In the aftermath of Wilander, the Supreme Court
summarily vacated the original Bach decision and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of its Wilander decision. But the Fifth
Circuit panel-Judge Brown again dissenting-reaffirmed its earlier view,
Court in Wilander
stating that "the rule announced by the' 3 Supreme
2
has no effect on our earlier conclusion."'
Bach seems a deplorable example of doctrinal rigidity. The court's
dismissal of the relevance of Wilander entails a remarkably narrow
reading of that decision. Even more telling is the court's "intuitive
appeal" language. The implication, of course, is that legal doctrine is
33
substantial and solid whereas human intuition is not to be trusted.'
But what the Bach opinion seeks to denigrate as "intuitive appeal" is
in fact the obvious appeal of clear national policy: the doctrines designed
by Congress and the courts to protect seamen against the dangers characteristic of seamen's work ought to be construed to cover workers who
regularly confront those dangers. This was the view of Judge Rubin; it
and it seems to be the
is the view of Judges Brown and Wisdom;
34
Court.1
Supreme
the
of
view
current
3.

The Rise and Fall of Pizzitolo

As indicated above, the judges in the Fifth Circuit who came to
deplore the breadth of Jones Act coverage under Robison developed a
number of doctrinal responses. The strangest thus far was the shortlived doctrine of Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp.3 ' Pizzitolo
has been extensively discussed elsewhere; 136 for present purposes it is

130. Bach, 920 F.2d at 324.
131. Id.at 325.
132. Bach, 947 F.2d at 1291. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 112 S. Ct.
1996 (1992).
133. Leon Green and many of the other American legal realists must be spinning in
their graves. See generally David Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56
Tex. L. Rev. 393 (1978).
134. But see supra note 132.
135. 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1959, 108 S. Ct. 1013 (1988).
Judge Davis, the author of the Barrett en banc majority opinion and of Bach, also wrote
Pizzitolo.
136. See Robertson, supra note 3, at 22-26; Note, The Jones Act Seaman-An Endangered Species, 12 Tul. Mar. L.J. 385 (1988). See also infra note 139.
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enough to know that it held that any worker'3 7 whose occupation is
"enumerated" among the list of covered, occupations in the LHWCA
is ipso facto "ineligible" for Jones Act coverage.'38 Some defense-minded
law review writers found ways to praise Pizzitolo,3 9 but its reasoning
was wrong in a very obvious way: The LHWCA list of covered occupations is qualified by the explicit exclusion of a "master or member
of a crew of any vessel."'' 4 Therefore, before one can conclude that a
worker is covered by the LHWCA (and therefore not the Jones Act' 4'),
one must not only determine that his occupation is "enumerated" but
also that the nature of his work did not qualify him a "master or
member of a crew of any vessel." Making the latter determination
requires applying the Robison (or some newly devised) set of criteria
for determining when a worker qualifies as a member of a crew of a
vessel. Pizzitolo did not devise new criteria for making that determination; instead it purported to deal with the troublesome "master or
member of a crew of any vessel" language simply by ignoring it.
The Supreme Court's brand-new unanimous' 42 decision in Southwest
Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni' 43 has flatly disapproved the Pizzitolo doctrine,
concluding:
[T~he term "employee", as defined in the LHWCA, does not
include "a master or member of a crew of any vessel ....
[It
is] therefore plainly wrong [to hold] that, as a matter of law,
the LHWCA provide[s] the exclusive remedy for all harbor
workers. That cannot be the case if the LHWCA and its exclusionary provision do not apply to a harbor worker who is
also a "member of a crew of any vessel". .44
[It is argued] in line with Fifth Circuit precedent, 14 that [seaman

137. The Pizzitolo decision is limited to workers injured within the geographical coverage of the LHWCA. See Pizzitolo, 812 F.2d at 983.
138. "In sum, we hold that because longshoremen, shipbuilders, and ship repairers
are engaged in occupations enumerated in the LHWCA, they are unqualifiedly covered
by that Act if they meet the Act's situs requirements; coverage of these workmen by the
LHWCA renders them ineligible for consideration as seamen or members of the crew of
a vessel entitled to claim the benefits of the Jones Act." Id.
139. See Eileen R. Madrid, Seaman Status: The Supreme Court Recharts Its Course:
Wilander and Gizoni, 51 La. L. Rev. 1149 (1991); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Seaman Status
Reconstructed, 32 S. Tex. L.J. 169 (1991).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
142. Justice Thomas did not participate.
143. 112 S. Ct. 486 (1991).
144. Id. at 491 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
145. As is discussed below, Judge Rubin's opinion in the Legros case demolished any
persuasiveness Pizzitolo might have had. But that opinion was vacated by the grant of
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status] may always be [denied] as a matter of law if the claimant's job fits within one of the enumerated occupations defining the term "employee" covered by the LHWCA. However,
this argument ignores the fact that some maritime workers may
be Jones Act seamen performing a job specifically enumerated
While in some cases a ship repairman
under the LHWCA ....
[or other worker holding one of the LHWCA enumerated occupations] may lack the requisite connection to a vessel in navigation to qualify for seaman status, not all ship repairmen lack
the requisite connection as a matter of law. This is so because
"[it is not the employee's particular job that is determinative,
but the employee's connection to a vessel." [citing Wilander]
By its terms the LHWCA preserves the Jones Act remedy for
vessel crewmen, even if they are employed by a shipyard [or
hold one of the other enumerated occupations]. A maritime
worker is limited to LHWCA remedies only if no genuine issue
of fact exists as to whether the worker was a seaman under the
Jones Act.'4
Judge Rubin would have been gratified by the Supreme Court's
Gizoni decision. Shortly after Pizzitolo was handed down he suggested
that the Pizzitolo reasoning was questionable inasmuch as the LHWCA
provision setting forth the "enumerated" covered occupations also contains the language expressly "excluding a master or member of a crew
of any vessel."'' 47 About a year later he took dead aim at the Pizzitolo
reasoning. The worker seeking seaman status in Legros v. Panther
Services Group, Inc. 48 did odd jobs-"chipping, painting, repairing,
inspecting, and on occasion moving' ' '49 a group of construction barges
operated by his employer. For a divided panel 0 Judge Rubin decisively
rejected the argument that, as a "ship repairman," Legros was automatically excluded from seaman status under Pizzitolo:

rehearing en banc in Legros. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, and infra text
accompanying notes 152-56. The Supreme Court pointed this out in Gizoni: "With the
opinion in Legros vacated, Pizzitolo remains the law in the Fifth Circuit, although its
breadth may be in some question." Gizoni, 112 S. Ct. at 490 n.l.
146. Id. at 492 (some citations omitted).
147. Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant on the seaman status issue) (emphasis in
original).
148. 863 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted (1989) (en banc), appeal dismissed,
874 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
149. Id. at 346.
150. Judge Wisdom joined Judge Rubin's opinion in Legros. Judge Edith Jones, who
had been a member of the Pizzitolo panel, filed a bitter dissent charging Judge Rubin
with an "extraordinary [breach of] the integrity of our circuit's law." Id. at 353.
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Before Pizzitolo, when faced with the question whether an employee was covered under the LHWCA or the Jones Act, our
analysis, like that of other circuits, did not focus on the occupations listed in the LHWCA, but on the language of the
exception-"member of a crew of a vessel"-and we applied
the Robison test to determine coverage under the Jones Act or
general maritime law.
be . [T]he method of analysis utilized in Pizzitolo cannot
be reconciled with the method used in our earlier Robison line
of cases.

Neither the text nor the legislative history of the ... LHWCA
requires this circuit to reconsider its application of the Robison
test to determine the status of workers who might arguably be
either seamen or shore-bound. If the classification of a worker
as a shipbuilder, longshoreman, or ship repairman automatically
precluded his having seaman's status, it would have been unnecessary for the LHWCA to except . . . crew members.'
Presumably because of the conflict 2 between the panel decisions in
Pizzitolo and Legros,'" the Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in
Legros, but the case was settled before an en banc decision could issue.
The grant of rehearing en banc had the effect of vacating Judge Rubin's
opinion for the panel. Nevertheless, experienced district judges were
ready to follow Legros, considering that it had "implicitly overruled"
Pizzitolo.5 4 The Supreme Court's Gizoni decision has now put the matter
to rest. On reasoning virtually identical to Judge Rubin's Legros opinion
the Court has dubbed the Pizzitolo theory "plainly wrong."' 55 After a
thirty-three year silence on the seaman status debate,3 6 the supposedly
ultra-conservative Supreme Court of the 1990s has thus rung in the
decade with two unanimous decisions upholding broad Jones Act coverage and substantially reflecting the views so ably upheld for so many
years by Judges Wisdom, Brown, and Rubin.

151. Id. at 349-50 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
152. But see supra text accompanying note 102.
153. To avoid the Fifth Circuit rule that one panel opinion cannot overrule another,
Judge Rubin was careful to say in Legros that the Pizzitolo result was correct. Nevertheless,
Judge Jones (dissenting in Legros) took him heavily to task for having violated the spirit
of that rule. Legros, 863 F.2d at 353-54. Judge Rubin responded that "the precept ...
applies more aptly to Pizzitolo [in its conflict with Robison] than to this opinion." Id.
at 349.
154. Pierre v. Ponchartrain Dredging, 713 F. Supp. 207, 208 (E.D. La. 1989).
155. Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 112 S. Ct. 486, 492 (1991).
156. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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LHWCA

Coverage

As indicated throughout Part I of this article, an injured worker
seeking compensation under the LHWCA must establish that he was7m
not a seaman, i.e., not "a master or member of a crew of any vessel.'
As the Act stood immediately before the extensive revision that occurred
in 1972, the only other significant coverage restriction' was a provision
limiting LHWCA relief to injuries occurring on the "navigable waters
5 9
of the United States (including any dry dock)."'
Under the Act as amended in 1972, the crew member exclusion is
retained,1w and there are two other principal coverage requirements.
First, the injury must have occurred "upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used
by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building
a vessel).' 16' Second, the injured worker must have been a "person
engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other
person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker .. ."62 The
foregoing two requirements-generally known as the "situs" and "status"
requirements-are necessary for the application of the LHWCA of its
own force. In addition, some workers 63 have access to LHWCA benefits
through the operation of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from
any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on
the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for,

157. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
158. The original Act also contained a provision seeming to say that LHWCA relief
was not available in any case in which state workers' compensation relief could constitutionally be had. Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, Ch. 509,
44 Stat. 1424 (1927). Over the years the Supreme Court diluted that provision into
meaninglessness. The culminating case was Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114,
82 S. Ct. 1196 (1962). See generally David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism 20221 (1970).

159.
(1927).
160.
161.
162.
163.
crew of

Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1426
33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988).
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1988).
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1988).
Like the LHWCA, the OCSLA provision excludes "a master or member of a
any vessel" from its coverage. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1) (1988).
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developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural
resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, compensation
shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 164
Judge Rubin's opinions made important contributions to the development and clarification of two issues raised by the quoted provisions.1'6
The first involved whether a worker injured on "actual navigable waters"'"
under circumstances that would have given rise to coverage under the
pre-1972 version of the LHWCA must meet the new Act's "status"
requirements, i.e., show that he was a "person engaged in maritime
employment" under the definition quoted above. In its en banc decision
in Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc. 67 the Fifth Circuit gave a
negative indication. Boudreaux held that a worker hurt while engaged
in his regular duties on a barge afloat in navigable water met the
LHWCA's situs and status tests; the court reasoned that Congress did
not intend to remove such persons from coverage when it amended the
Act to add the "maritime employment" requirement in 1972. Following
up on Boudreaux, Judge Rubin's decision in Ward v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs'6" held that the pilot of a fish
spotter airplane that crashed in navigable waters was covered by the
LHWCA. Judge Rubin succinctly explained the meaning of Boudreaux:
"lAin employee injured in the regular course of his employment on the
navigable waters of the United States automatically meets both the status
and situs tests.' 1 69 Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court's decision in
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North
River Associates' 70 proclaimed the identical proposition.

164. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1988).
165. The dictum in Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1117 n.14 (5th Cir. Unit
A Apr. 1981), to the effect that the LHWCA term "navigable waters of the United
States" is confined to territorial waters, might be cited as a third contribution by Judge
Rubin to questions of LHWCA coverage. However, the better view on that specific
question seems to be otherwise. See Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 788 F.2d 264,
268-72 (5th Cir. 1986); Cove Tankers Corp. v. United Ship Repair, Inc., 683 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1982). (The more important aspect of Aparicio is discussed infra at notes 189-

98.).
166. See Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs.,
459 U.S. 297, 299 &n.2, 103 S. Ct. 634, 637 & n.2 (1983) (using the expression "actual
navigable waters" to "describe the covered situs as it existed in the 1927 LHWCA:
'Navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)."').
167. 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. A.W.I., Inc. v.
American Ins. Co., 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S. Ct. 815 (1983).
168. 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.W.I., Inc. v. American
Ins. Co., 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S.Ct. 815 (1983).
169. Id. at 1116.
170. 459 U.S. 297, 103 S.Ct. 634 (1983).
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The other coverage issue in which Judge Rubin played a significant
role involved the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) extension
of the LHWCA. By its terms that provision extends the benefits of the
LHWCA to workers injured "as the result of [oil and gas] operations
conducted on the outer Continental Shelf."' 171 Note that it does not state
that the injury must occur on the shelf. In light of the provision's clear
language Judge Rubin joined Judge Duhe's panel opinion in Mills v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 72 upholding coverage for a worker hurt ashore while building a platform destined for
outer continental shelf operations. When the en banc Fifth Circuit
determined (by a margin of nine to five) to reverse and hold thatdespite its language-the OCSLA provision does require that the injury
occur on the shelf, Judge Rubin joined the dissent, 17 stating that he
adhered to the views expressed in Judge Duhe's panel opinion. The
essence of that opinion was that the OCSLA provision means what it
says. Under the en banc holding in Mills, it no longer does.
B.

Tort Actions On Behalf of LHWCA Workers

By its terms the original LHWCA 74 made workers' compensation
benefits the covered workers' exclusive remedy against their employers.
The Act was silent as to these workers' tort rights against non-employer
entities. In the two decades following World War II a series of Supreme
Court decisions created a structure of remedies and obligations that
seemed quite different from that contemplated by the Act.
First, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki 7 1 held that some longshore and
harbor workers-who were not seamen but who were considered to be
engaged in work historically done by seamen-could sue non-employer
vessels for unseaworthiness. (The relevant law defines "vessel" to include
the vessel and its "owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter
[sic] or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member." 176 In the
remainder of this discussion, I will use the term vessel in the same
broad way.)
The second major development occurred in Ryan Stevedoring Co.
v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.," in which the Court held that when the

171. See supra text accompanying note 164.
172. 846 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
173. Judge Duhe wrote a two-page dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Politz and
Williams. Mills, 877 F.2d at 362-64. In a separate one-sentence dissenting opinion Judges
Rubin and Johnson merely said they agreed with the panel opinion. Id. at 364.
174. Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424,
1426-27, 1429, 1431-32, 1433-36 (1927).
175. 328 U.S. 85, 66 S. Ct. 872 (1946).
176. 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (1988).
177. 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232 (1956).
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unseaworthy condition giving rise to the non-employer vessel's liability
to the longshore worker was caused, created, or brought into play by
the injured worker's employer, the vessel was entitled to full indemnity
from the employer for breaching an express or implied warranty to
perform the longshoring operations in a reasonably safe manner. Of
course, Ryan meant that the LHWCA provision making workers' compensation benefits the workers' exclusive remedy against their employers
was effectively negated. The recurrent waterfront situation whereby the
injured longshore worker recovered in tort from the vessel on the basis
of unseaworthiness and the vessel in turn recovered over against the
employer on the basis of the warranty of workmanlike performance
came to be known as the "Ryan triangle."
Finally, Reed v. The Yaka17s held that a LHWCA worker who was
directly employed by the vessel could sue the employer/vessel for unseaworthiness. Reed in effect demonstrated that the Court was committed
to the Sieracki-Ryan structure and could stare the LHWCA's exclusive
remedy provision in the face without flinching. "The effect of the Yaka
rule was to place the maritime worker hired directly by the vessel in
the same position, insofar as his claim against the vessel was concerned,
who was engaged indirectly, through an indeas the maritime worker
79
contractor.'
pendent
In 1972 Congress swept away most of the Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka structure. One finds the three key provisions scattered throughout section
905(b) of the new Act. First, section 905(b) provides that covered workers
have no cause of action for unseaworthiness but can sue non-employer
vessels for negligence. s0 Second, it states that vessels held liable to
covered workers for negligence cannot recover over against the workers'
employers.' 8' Finally, it includes two troublesome sentences designed to
deal with the Yaka situation, i.e., LHWCA workers who are directly
employed by a vessel. Of course, these workers-like those in the more
typical situation of employment by an independent contractor-can no
longer sue for unseaworthiness. But inasmuch as a LHWCA worker can
sue a non-employer vessel for negligence, should an otherwise identically

178.

373 U.S. 410, 83 S. Ct. 1349 (1963).

179. Maraist, supra note 14, at 255.
180. "In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter causeol by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel .... The liability of the

vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a
breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection
33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel .
(1988).
181. "[Tlhe employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." Id.
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situated worker who is directly employed by the vessel not also have a
negligence remedy against the vessel/employer? Section 905(b) answers
as follows:
If such person [a person covered under the LHWCA] was [directly] employed by the vessel to perform stevedoring services,
no such action [for vessel negligence] shall be permitted if the
injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was
employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services
and such person's employer was the owner, owner pro hac vice,
agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel, no such action shall
be permitted, in whole or in part or directly or indirectly against
the injured person's employer (in any capacity, including as the
vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer)
or against the employees of the employer." s2
The 1972 (and subsequent" 3 ) amendments to the LHWCA have presented the courts with many interesting questions. In the remainder of
this section we will discuss four issues as to which Judge Rubin's
decisions have played a major role: (a) Which maritime workers retain
the right to sue vessels for unseaworthiness? (b) What are the contours
and limits of the new' 4 negligence remedy? (This issue has both a
substantive component, treated below in subsection II-B-2, and a jurisdictional component, discussed in subsection II-B-3.) (c) When a LHWCA
worker is injured through a combination of the vessel's and his employer's negligence, how does the employer's negligence affect the worker's rights against the vessel? (d) When can LHWCA workers who are
directly employed by vessels succeed in tort against the employer/vessel?
1.

Who Can Sue for Unseaworthiness?

Before Sieracki, only seamen could sue for personal injuries caused
by unseaworthiness. The Sieracki decision extended the unseaworthiness

182. Id. Note that the first quoted sentence deals with longshoremen and the second
with shipyard workers. As originally enacted in 1972 these two sentences of § 905(b)
treated directly employed longshoremen and directly employed shipyard workers alike.
The second sentence quoted in the text was added by 1984 amendment. Before the
amendment that sentence read as follows: "If such person was [directly] employed by
the vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be permitted
if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building
or repair services to the vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1972) (amended 1984).
183. Further major changes were made in 1984. See, e.g., supra note 182.
184. Before 1972 workers entitled under Sieracki, supra note 175, to sue vessels for
unseaworthiness could also have sued for negligence. But the strict liability action for
unseaworthiness was so broad and powerful that the courts never had occasion to discuss
the nature of vessel negligence in this context.
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cause of action to all maritime workers aboard the vessel doing work
that had historically been done by members of the vessel's crew. Such
workers came to be called "Sieracki seamen." Section 905(b) of the
1972 LHWCA takes the unseaworthiness action away from "any person
covered under" the LHWCA.8 s A problem arises because the class of
Sieracki seamen was broader than the class of workers covered by the
LHWCA. a6 Do Sieracki seamen who are not covered by the LHWCA
retain the cause of action for unseaworthiness?
Some courts outside the Fifth Circuit have held no, taking the bold
view that, despite the restrictive language of the new section 905(b), the
1972 Congress plainly "intended to eliminate the longshoremen's action
for unseaworthiness not only with respect to those longshoremen covered
by the Act, but for other longshoremen whose rights were judicially
created.' 17 A distinguished scholarly commentator describes this result
as "[tihe majority, and perhaps the better view."' 8 8 But the better view
is rather plainly to the contrary, as Judge Rubin explained in Aparicio
v. Swan Lake.8 9
The workers seeking to maintain unseaworthiness actions in Aparicio
were four Panama Canal linehandlers. Because their work was of the
sort historically done by crew members, they easily qualified as Sieracki
seamen. As a vessel negotiating the canal would approach a lock, "Itihe
linehandlers [would] board the vessel ... and fasten a cable to the
vessel attached to the electric locomotives called 'mules' which tow the
vessel through the lock."'19 These men were not "true" seamen, because
they were "not more or less permanently assigned to a particular vessel
or to a specific fleet of vessels but instead perform[ed] duties aboard
any vessel that happen[ed] to be navigating the Canal."' 9' Nor were
they covered by the LHWCA; they worked for the Panama Canal
Company, an agency of the United States, and were thereby excluded
from LHWCA coverage. 92 Judge Rubin concluded that the LHWCA
should be read the way Congress wrote it:

185. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
186. See Maraist, supra note 14, at 249-50.
187. Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Phil., 643 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing
legislative history).
188. Maraist, supra note 14, at 250.
189. 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981). In addition to its importance as an admiralty
case, Aparicio has also been widely cited on an arcane point of federal appellate procedure.
See, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 160, 104 S. Ct.
1723, 1730 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Aparicio, 643 F.2d at 1114 n.7.
191. Id.
192. "No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of an
officer or employee of the United States, or any agency thereof ... ." 33 U.S.C. § 903(b)
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Literally read, Section 905(b), which Congress enacted to abolish
the Sieracki remedy, does not apply to maritime workers who
are not within the coverage of the LHWCA. The statute manifests no intention to expand the abolition of the Sieracki-Ryan
construct beyond the coverage of the LHWCA. We refuse to
read into it the abolition of judicially-built remedies as they
apply to maritime workers not covered by the LHWCA.... 193
Thus, Judge Rubin held: "[I]f the harbor worker is not covered by the
LHWCA, the Sieracki cause of action and the concomitant indemnification action afforded the vessel owner [under Ryan] are both still
seaworthy." 94
The narrow holding of Aparicio was limited to federally employed
longshore and harbor workers, but its reasoning extended to all workers
covered by Sieracki but not by the LHWCA. Unfortunately, three subsequent panel decisions of the Fifth Circuit have rejected much of Judge
Rubin's Aparicio reasoning by holding that a true seaman-a member
of the crew of vessel A-who is hurt while temporarily working aboard
vessel B cannot sue vessel B for unseaworthiness.195 These departures
from the straightforward approach of Aparicio are unfortunate. From
the beginning Congress has specifically excluded "a member of a crew
of any vessel"' ' from LHWCA coverage, and the provision restricting
the unseaworthiness remedy by its terms applies only to covered workers. '9
None of the questionable decisions offers any satisfactory explanation
for concluding that a worker who is concededly "a member of a crew
of any vessel"-vessel A-has lost his right to sue vessel B for unseaworthiness because of a statutory provision that by its plain terms does
not cover him.
In light of the three panel decisions discussed above, Aparicio presumably now stands for the proposition that workers excluded from
LHWCA coverage on any basis other than seamen status still have
whatever unseaworthiness rights they had before the 1972 amendments
to the LHWCA. Seamen, though, have lost some rights by reason of

(1988). Federally employed longshore and harbor workers have a workers' compensation
remedy under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq (1988),
which says nothing about unseaworthiness actions.
193. Aparicio, 643 F.2d at 1116.
194. Id.at 1110.
195. See Smith v.Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 1107 (1991); Bridges v. Penrod Drilling Co., 740 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.

1984); Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1982). See the criticism
of the Burks and Bridges decisions in David W. Robertson, Current Problems In Seamen's
Remedies, 45 La. L. Rev. 875, 899-906 (1985).
196. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G) (1988) (emphasis supplied).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 185 and 193.
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a statute that purports to exclude them. This is a strange state of affairs.
One cannot help regretting that the court did not grant en banc rehearing
in one of those cases while Judge Rubin was here to help straighten it
98

out. 1

2.

The Vessel's Duties Under Section 905(b)

Section 905(b) limits vessels"" tort exposure to LHWCA workers
to "negligence" liability without defining the term. 2 In early decisions
°
under the 1972 Act courts therefore looked to the legislative history,1 1
°2
where they found conflicting indications. One set of indications pointed
toward giving LHWCA workers the broad, simple negligence remedy
described as part of the general maritime law by the well-known Supreme
20 3
Court decision in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.
Under that approach the vessel would owe the LHWCA worker a general
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, with no particularized
doctrinal limitations. The conflicting indications in the legislative history
pointed toward limiting the vessel's duty by analogy to limitations that
had developed in the tort law of some states to control the responsibility
of a landowner to the employees of an independent contractor engaged

to do work on the land.2

198. Cf. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S.Ct. 2430 (1983) ("We decline to inject another element
of inconsistency into an area already beset by more than its fair share of incongruous
results") (Rubin, J.) (footnote omitted).
199. Recall the broad LHWCA definition of "vessel" being used in this discussion.
See supra text accompanying note 176.
200. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
201. See supra note 184, for an explanation of why no jurisprudence on the meaning
of vessel negligence in this context had developed before 1972.
202. "[T]he Committee does not intend that the negligence remedy authorized in this
bill shall be applied differently in different ports depending on the law of the State in
which the port may be located. The Committee intends that legal questions which may
arise in actions brought under these provisions of the law shall be determined as a matter
of Federal law. In that connection, the Committee intends that the admiralty concept of
comparative negligence, rather than the common law rule of contributory negligence, shall
apply in cases where the injured employee's own negligence may have contributed to
causing the injury. Also, the Committee intends that the admiralty rule which precludes
the defense of 'assumption of risk' in an action by an injured employee shall also be
applicable." H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2d sess. 8, Serial Set 12974-6 (1972),
reprinted in 1972 U.C.C.A.N. at 4705. The Senate Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 1125
(1972), was "in all relevant respects identical." Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los
Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 165 n.13, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1621 n.13 (1981).
203. 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406 (1959).
204. Several times in the House and Senate Committee reports the following thought
appears: "[Dlisputes as to whether the vessel was negligent in a particular case ...can
only be resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary
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The differences between these two broad approaches are many and
nuanced, 2 5 but the single most important difference involves the recurrent
situation of an injury on a vessel caused by a dangerous condition that
was open and obvious or otherwise known to the injured worker. Under
the Kermarec approach, denying recovery because the condition was
open and obvious or otherwise known to the worker would be regarded
as a de facto application of the assumption of risk defense and therefore
inappropriate under general maritime law. 2° But under the land-based
approach, courts are led to certain provisions in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts °7 stating that recovery for open and obvious dangers should
be denied unless the worker can show that the defendant "should [have]
anticipate[d] the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." 2 8
The early section 905(b) jurisprudence was murky, with the federal
circuits tending to split between the two broad approaches described.
Courts in the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits took the Kermarec approach, more or less. 2°9 Courts in the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
inclined toward the land-based approach. 210 The Fifth Circuit decision

process of litigation-just as they are in cases involving alleged negligence by land-based
third parties. The Committee intends that on the one hand an employee injured on board
a vessel shall be in no less favorable position vis a vis his rights against the vessel as a
third party than is an employee who is injured on land, and on the other hand, that the
vessel shall not be liable as a third party unless it is proven to have acted or have failed
to act in a negligent manner such as would render a land-based third party in nonmaritime pursuits liable under similar circumstances." H.R. Rep. No. 1441, supra note
202.,
205. The two approaches differ at their core. Kermarec rejected the invitee-licensee
distinction as well as the entire land-based law of occupier's liability as "foreign to
[admiralty's] traditions of simplicity and practicality." Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 631, 79 S.
Ct. at 410. The approach suggested by the land-based analogy embraces the invitee-licensee
distinction and the rather complex body of limitations on land occupier liability associated
with that distinction. See generally David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on
Torts 274-98 (1989).
206. See supra note 202.
207. When a federal court starts looking around for a nationally uniform land-based
tort law, it can research the law of the fifty states or it can resort to a summary. Naturally
it resorts to a summary, which leads inexorably to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
This is a scholarly treatise, the work of an American Law Institute "reporter" and his
advisers, but its format is that of a statute book. Because of the prestige of the American
Law Institute and because the treatises it publishes are called restatements and masquerade
as volumes of statutes, courts routinely treat them as far more authoritative than any
scholarly work (other than the work of the present author) should be treated. The courts
thus fail to do their own thinking.
208. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(l) (1985). The full Restatement treatment
of this matter appears in §§ 342, 343, and 343A.
209. See the citations in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S.
156, 163 n.9, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1619 n.9 (1981).
210. Id.
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in Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd.,211 taking the land-based
road, seemed to long for a middle ground between the two approaches.
212
the court
After quoting the key passages of the legislative history
stated:
From these passages and section 905(b) itself we distill the
following conclusions:
(1) Congress intends for the federal courts to develop a
uniform federal common law to control LHWCA suits
against vessels.
(2) That LHWCA federal common law is to be based on
negligence concepts; the unseaworthiness of a vessel is not
an acceptable ground for relief.
(3) LHWCA negligence law is to be guided primarily by
analogy to land-based concepts. The stevedore is to be
viewed generally as an independent contractor and its employees as invitees of the vessel owner.
(4) However, certain common land-based principles of state
law are not to be carried over into the federal law governing
LHWCA suits. Assumption of risk may not be utilized as
rather than cona defense, and comparative negligence,
213
applied.
be
to
is
negligence,
tributory
The Gay court decided to be "guided primarily by analogy to landbased concepts" but was troubled by the conflict between admiralty's
disapproval of the assumed risk defense and the land-based law's sympathy to the "open and obvious" defensive doctrine. Attempting a
reconciliation, the court stated that "the obviousness or knowledge of
a dangerous condition on certain property does not necessarily relieve
the owner of his obligation ' 21 4 and that it disapproved of "the traditional
rule that if a hazard is open and obvious that fact alone absolves the
owner of his negligence. '215 Nevertheless, the court ultimately affirmed
a lower court decision denying recovery to an injured longshoreman in
major part because of the obviousness of the danger, 216 and the opinion
explicitly states that "we have adopted the formulation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.... ,,217
Judge Rubin's opinion in Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas
2 18
began by stating that in Gay the Fifth Circuit had "adopted
Argentinas

211. 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977).
212. See supra notes 202 and 204.
213. Gay, 546 F.2d at 1237-38.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.at 1241.
Id. at 1242.
See id. at 1240.
Id.at 1242.
573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1978).
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the rules set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts for determining
what is negligence under § 905(b)." 21 9 But he went on to affirm recovery
on behalf of a longshoreman who had fallen into a dimly lighted open
space behind a ladder leading into a cargo hold. The Samuels opinion
states that the danger "would have been open and obvious had the area
been well lighted,''n 0 which it was not, and that while plaintiff's employer
and some of the other longshoremen knew of the danger "there was
evidence that the plaintiff himself did not know of it, and that it had
never been called to his attention.''2 Most important, probably, was
the observation that the defendant "withdrew his requested instruction
with respect to liability for open and obvious dangers, and the issue

[was] not raised on appeal.'

'222

When the conflict among the circuits as to the proper approach to
determining section 905(b) negligence finally reached the Supreme Court
3
in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos,22
the resulting
decision greatly disappointed everyone who had hoped for clarification.
Eight members of the Court participated. 224 Justice White's majority
opinion, fully joined by only two other justices, sidesteps the muchdebated Torts Restatement issue, stating only that the Restatement's
provisions, "while not irrelevant, do not furnish sure guidance in cases
such as this.'' 225 The Scindia opinion discusses the vessel's obligations
under section 905(b) at some length and is difficult to summarize. (The
excellent Admiralty "Nutshell" devotes four full pages to parsing Scindia." 6) It is sufficiently equivocal that three justices specially concurred
on the general view that the Court had adopted a slightly modified
Kermarec approach 227 while two others specially concurred on the opposing view that the Court had upheld the land-based limitations crystallized in the Torts Restatement. 22 Here is what the Court seems to
have held:
(1) The shipowner has a duty to avoid negligent conduct associated with any active involvement in cargo or related operations.2 29

219. Id.at 885.
220. Id.at 886.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (1981).
224. Chief Justice Burger did not participate. See Scindia, 451 U.S. at 179, 101 S.
Ct. at 1628.
225. Id.at 168 n.14, 101 S. Ct. at 1622 n.14.
226. Maraist, supra note 14, at 257-61.
227. See Scindia, 451 U.S. at 179-80, 101 S. Ct. at 1628 (Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
228. See id. at 180-81, 101 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
229. See id. at 167, 101 S. Ct. at 1622.
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(2) When the shipowner turns the ship over to the stevedoring
contractor (or other independent contractor engaged to perform
loading, unloading, or similar operations on the vessel), the
shipowner must have either remedied dangerous conditions or
he must warn the stevedoring contractor of dangers (a) that the
shipowner knows about or should know about from reasonable
inspection, (b) that the contractor will probably encounter during
the operations, and (c) that a reasonably competent contractor
would not discover for itself.230
(3) Respecting dangers that develop during the contractor's operations on the vessel, the shipowner may have a duty of reasonable care if such a duty is imposed by "contract provision,
positive law, or custom." 23' Otherwise, the shipowner has no
duty unless he (a) actually knew of the danger and (b) should
have realized that the contractor's safety practices and "judgment
[were] so obviously improvident" 3 2 as to necessitate some corrective action.
The Scindia opinion tried to straddle the two conflicting approaches
to determining section 905(b) liability suggested by the legislative history.
The effort did not clarify the law as much as was needed. Still, it seems
evident that the Court came down in general favor of the land-based
restrictions on vessel liability. In that general way, at least, it can be
said that the Court has validated the Fifth Circuit approach illustrated
by Judge Rubin's opinion in Samuels.
3.

Section 905(b)'s JurisdictionalLimitation

As amended in 1972 the LHWCA covers injuries occurring on
navigable waters as well as on "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area custom2"
arily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling,
23 4
There is no indication that the geographical
or building a vessel."
coverage of section 905(b) is any less extensive. Therefore workers hurt
on the landward areas covered by the Act can be expected to bring tort
actions based on section 905(b).
The Fifth Circuit early held that when a section 905(b) action is
sought to be maintained in federal court on the basis of admiralty

230. Id.
231. Id.at 172, 101
232. Id.at 175, 101
233. "Dismantling"
amended by 33 U.S.C.
234. Id.

S. Ct. at 1624.
S. Ct. at 1625.
was added to the provision in 1984. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1984),
§ 903(a) (1988).
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jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make the normal jurisdictional showing.235
Admiralty jurisdiction in tort entails: (a) a "locality" requirement-the
injury must have occurred on navigable water or have been caused by
a vessel on navigable water 236-and (b) a "maritime nexus" requirement-the circumstances of the injury must bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity. 237 (In this jurisdictional formula "vessel"
does not take the broad meaning given it by the LHWCA 23 1 but means
an actual completed and operational vessel afloat on navigable water.)
When a LHWCA worker is hurt under circumstances covered by section
905(b) it is difficult to understand how the case could fail to satisfy
the nexus requirement. 3 9 But obviously a worker hurt on the landward
area covered by section 905(b) has potential trouble with the locality
requirement; the worker can satisfy that requirement only by showing
that the injury was caused by an actual completed vessel on navigable
water. If the worker cannot do that, an action in admiralty must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Rubin's opinion in May v. Transworld Drilling Co. 24° undertook to sort out a metaphysical muddle that had arisen in connection
with the foregoing requirement:
Our opinions interpreting the applicability of § 905(b) to injuries
that are allegedly caused by the negligence of a vessel under
construction, whether on water or on dry land, contain statements that are not fully consistent. The inconsistency has arisen,
perhaps in part, because we have not always distinguished jurisdiction from the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to
2 41
establish a claim under § 905(b).
As it presented itself to the Fifth Circuit the May case' illustrated the
muddle. A worker hurt on land building new ships-not yet "vessels"
for admiralty jurisdiction purposes-brought a section 905(b) action in

235. Parker v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 537 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1174 (1985).
236. The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1988),
states that admiralty jurisdiction "shall extend to and include all cases" of injury caused
by a vessel on navigable water. Despite that language, it seems reasonably clear that
admiralty jurisdiction does not exist in such cases absent the "significant relationship with
maritime activity" showing. See, e.g., Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States
Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1135 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 102 S.
Ct. 635 (1981).
237. See generally Maraist, supra note 14, at 30-42.
238. See supra text accompanying note 176.
239. But see Dean v. State, 542 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ ref., 544 So.
2d 410 (La. 1989).
240. 786 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854, 107 S. Ct. 190 (1986).
241. Id. at 1264.
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federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The trial judge
dismissed the action. On appeal the defendant argued that the trial judge
was correct in dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Rubin pointed out that the argument was ill-conceived:
The court below had jurisdiction on the basis of diversity; it had

for failure to state "a negligence
dismissed the action on the merits,
2' 4
905(b).
§
under
cognizable
claim
Judge Rubin then upheld the correctness of the trial judge's dismissal
of the action on the merits and sought to dispel the confusion: "[W]e

here explicitly hold that § 905(b) permits only the assertion of a claim
for a maritime tort ....

The test to determine the existence of a cause

of action in maritime tort is identical with that applied to determine
jurisdiction in admiralty." 3 Because the May plaintiff could not show
that his injury occurred on navigable water or was caused by a vessel
on navigable water, he had no cause of action under section 905(b).
Subsequently the en banc Fifth Circuit confirmed the correctness of

Judge Rubin's May reasoning1 44 It is now clear that when a section
905(b) action is sought to be maintained on the basis of admiralty
jurisdiction, the federal court must dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction if the plaintiff cannot make the required "locality" and

"nexus" showings.24 5 On the other hand, when the federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction on some basis other than admiralty, a section
905(b) plaintiff who cannot make the "locality" and "nexus" showings

is subject to dismissal on the meritsY26 Similarly, a state court must
dismiss a section 905(b) action on the merits when it determines that
the plaintiff cannot make the same "locality" and "nexus" showings
that are necessary for establishing admiralty jurisdiction. 247

242. Id. at 1263.
243. Id. at 1264-65 (footnote omitted).
244. Richendollar v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 819 F.2d 124 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S. Ct. 331 (1987).
245. See, e.g., Margin v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1987).
246. In Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1987), a
worker hurt while repairing a vessel pulled up onto the land brought a Jones Act claim
and a § 905(b) claim in the alternative. Asserting a colorable Jones Act claim suffices
for subject matter jurisdiction. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 381, 79 S. Ct. 468, 485 (1958). See also infra text accompanying note 338.
Nevertheless the Leonard trial judge dismissed the § 905(b) claim "for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." Leonard, 828 F.2d at 293. This seems questionable; surely the better
resolution would have been to maintain jurisdiction over the § 905(b) claim as a pendent
claim and to dismiss it on the merits. Because the dismissal of the § 905(b) claim was
not appealed, Judge Rubin did not address the matter in his Leonard opinion. See Leonard,
828 F.2d at 293.
247. See Dean v. State, 542 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ ref., 544 So. 2d
410 (La. 1989).
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Finally, while none of the decisions has explicitly addressed the
point, it seems to follow from the courts' reasoning that a plaintiff
whose injury falls within the coverage of the LHWCA-but who cannot
make the "locality" and "nexus" showings-will not be able to maintain
a state-law tort action against an entity covered by the broad LHWCA
definition of "vessel. ' ' 4s Section 905(b) states that "the remedy provided
in this subsection is exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel .. ."249 May does not mean that section 905(b) does not cover
injuries to workers who cannot meet the "locality" and "nexus" tests;
on the contrary, it seems to mean that section 905(b) does cover those
workers but operates to deny them a negligence remedy as a matter of
substantive law. Thus it is a strange feature of this line of cases that
the maritime law denies certain workers a tort remedy under circumstances in which an admiralty court lacks jurisdiction to decree the
denial.250 This conclusion is perhaps explicable on the well-accepted view
that the boundaries of the constitutional concept of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction (and therefore of the potential reach of the federal
maritime law) are broader than the boundaries of the admiralty jurisdiction that has been granted to the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. section
1333. But surely it would have produced a simpler and more attractive
conceptual structure had the courts held that the "locality" showing is
not required for admiralty jurisdiction in cases covered by section 905(b).Y1
This would have left the courts free to conclude, as did Judge Rubin
in May, that the "locality" showing is required to establish a section
905(b) cause of action. As matters now stand, the substantive federal
maritime law rule established by May binds the state courts but can
actually be applied by a federal court only if (fortuitously) its subject
matter jurisdiction has been invoked on some basis other than admiralty.
4.

The Effect of Employer Fault

Under well settled general maritime law an injured maritime worker's
negligence has always reduced his tort recovery on a percentage-fault
basis.25 2 Nothing in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA has affected

248. See supra text accompanying note 176.
249. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
250. See also infra text at notes 334-41.
251. On this view the Fifth Circuit went astray in Parker v. South La. Contractors,
Inc., 537 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906, 97 S. Ct. 1174 (1977).
See the criticism of the Parker decision in David W. Robertson, Jurisdiction, Shipowner
Negligence and Stevedore Immunities Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's
Act, 28 Mercer L. Rev. 515, 522-28 (1977).
252. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259-60, 99
S. Ct. 2753, 2755-56 (1979).
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that feature of the law. But the 1972 amendments generated several
potential new questions respecting the effect of any negligence on the
part of the injured worker's employer. Of course, it is clear that the
employer is responsible to the worker for compensation payments only
and cannot be sued in tort. The questions involve the effect of employer
negligence on the worker's tort action against the non-employer vessel.
Before the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, neither the negligence
of the vessel nor the negligence of the injured worker's employer was
particularly relevant. Regardless of employer or vessel negligence, Sieracki
allowed the worker to recover from the vessel whenever any feature of
the vessel, appurtenances, or operational methods made it "unseaworthy," i.e., less than reasonably fit for the ongoing operation. Nor was
the employer's negligence centrally important to the vessel's right to
recover over against the employer under Ryan. The question was not
whether the employer was negligent, but whether it had breached the
implied warranty of workmanlike performance.
Under the 1972 amendments, what happens when the vessel and the
employer are both negligent in such a way as to cause the LHWCA
worker's injuries? Scindia contemplates that in some situations of that
sort the vessel will be liable to the injured worker. In such a case three
questions might arise. (a) Does the vessel have any right to contribution
from the employer? Unequivocally the statute says no: "[TIhe employer
shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly
'
(b)
and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void." 253
Since its inception the LHWCA has contemplated that an employer held
responsible for compensation payments can come into the injured worker's tort action as a subrogee or lienholder to recoup the compensation
payments.21 4 In the Sieracki-Ryan era this subrogation right or compensation lien was practically meaningless respecting workers' tort actions
against vessels, because typically the vessel would ultimately recover over
fully from the employer. But now that recovery over from the employer
has been cut off, the question frequently arises whether employer negligence should reduce the compensation lien. (c) Should the employer's
percentage of negligence reduce the worker's recovery from the vessel?
Whether the employer's negligence should reduce the employer's
compensation lien and/or the worker's recovery from the vessel are
interrelated questions that produced a large amount of scholarly debate
after the 1972 legislation went into effect, and the courts took a variety
of positions. 25 Judge Rubin addressed these "res nova" questions in

253. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
254. See 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1988).
255. See the citations in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S.
256, 99 S.Ct. 2753 passim (1979), and in Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas,
573 F.2d 884, 887-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 3106 (1978).
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2 56
and quickly found
Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas
the straightest and simplest solution. First he held that the compensation
lien should not be reduced because doing so would amount to allowing
contribution against the employer, a result forbidden by the clear terms
of section 905(b). 211 Then he turned to the more critical question, whether
the worker's recovery should be reduced to reflect the employer's percentage of fault. A key to Judge Rubin's thinking here is the realization
that, absent some alteration worked by the provisions of the LHWCA,
the general law would regard the vessel and employer whose negligence
has combined to injure the worker as joint tortfeasors subject to joint
and several liability:

Under the present law, if the employer is found negligent, it
(or most likely its insurer) would nonetheless be made whole
via the compensation lien. To permit the employer's negligence
to reduce the joint tortfeasor vessel's liability would reduce the
award of plaintiff, the one person who is blameless. The innocent
victim of concurrent negligence would find that, through some
(to him inscrutable) judicial attempt to achieve equity for other
parties, he must accept a partial loaf 28of compensation for the
full loaf of joint and several liability.
Absent a specific direction from Congress to reduce the worker's recovery
to reflect employer fault, Judge Rubin believed the better result was to
hold the shipowner to the full "consequence[s] ... of its own negli-

gence. "259
One year later the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique260 fully agreed with Judge Rubin as to
both propositions. Reducing the compensation lien to reflect employer
fault should not be allowed because this "would be the substantial
equivalent of contribution ' 261 which Congress has expressly forbidden.
Reducing the worker's recovery to reflect employer fault should not be
allowed because, while "[s]ome inequity appears inevitable in the present
statutory scheme, . . . we find nothing to indicate and should not
presume that Congress intended to place the burden of the inequity on
the longshoreman whom the Act seeks to protect.' '262

256.

Samuels, 573 F.2d at 887.

257. Id. at 888. Recall that § 905(b) denounces allowing employer liability "directly
or indirectly." See supra text at note 253.
258. Samuels, 573 F.2d at 889 (citation omitted).
259. Id. at 888.
260. 443 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2753 (1979).
261. Id. at 270 n.28, 99 S. Ct. at 2761 n.28 (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406, 412, 74 S.Ct. 202, 206 (1953)).
262. Id. at 270, 99 S. Ct. at 2761.
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LHWCA Workers Directly Employed by Vessels

Most longshore workers are employed by independent contractors
engaged to do work on and for the vessel. In this "typical tripartite
situation, the longshoreman is not only guaranteed the statutory compensation from his employer, he may also recover tort damages [under
section 905(b)] if he can prove negligence by the vessel. 2 63 The second
sentence of section 905(b) provides as follows: "If [the LHWCA worker]
was [directly] employed by the vessel to perform stevedoring services,
no [negligence action against the vessel] shall be permitted if the injury
was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring
services to the vessel." 2" The Supreme Court has held that the quoted
sentence means that a negligence "action is authorized against the vessel
even when there is no independent stevedore and the longshoreman is
employed directly by the vessel owner. ' 26 The directly employed worker
can recover in tort if he can meet the requirements of Scindia and May,
and if he can persuade the court that the negligence of the defendant,
who is both employer and vessel, occurred in its vessel rather than its
2
employer capacity. "
The foregoing discussion relates to workers involved in longshoring
operations. Until amendment in 1984, a third sentence of section 905(b)
made identical provision for shipyard workers who were directly employed by vessels.2 67 The 1984 amendment substituted the following
provision: "If [the LHWCA worker] was employed to provide shipbuilding, repairing, or breaking services and such person's [direct] employer was the [vessel], no [negligence] action shall be permitted .... ,,26
The quoted provision has spawned a line of jurisprudence addressing
whether particular workers were engaged in "repairing" and the like so
as to be precluded from the negligence remedy. Judge Rubin authored
two such decisions. In both he reversed trial court holdings that the
affected workers were, as a matter of law, engaged in ship repair work
and therefore barred from suing in negligence. The worker in New v.
Associated Painting Services26 9 spent much of his time sandblasting and
painting both semi-submersible drilling rigs (vessels) and stationary oil
platforms. He was hurt doing such work on a semi-submersible rig. The

263. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530, 103 S. Ct. 2541,
2547 (1983).
264. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
265. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 530, 103 S. Ct. at 2547.
266. See Gay v. Barge 266, 915 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing directed
verdict for defendant and holding that evidence raised a fact issue whether the employer/
vessel, in its capacity as vessel, was negligent) (Rubin, J.).
267. See supra note 182.
268. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1988).
269. 863 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1989).

1568

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 52

trial judge was wrong to grant summary judgment that the worker was
a ship repairer, Judge Rubin explained, because the issue is by its nature
closely fact-bound: "[If the worker] is hired to restore a vessel to safe
operating condition, he has been hired to perform "repairing ... services" under § 905(b). If, however, he is hired to preserve the vessel's
current condition, he is performing routine maintenance not covered by
the section. ' 270 In Gay v. Barge 26611 the trial judge focused narrowly
on the work the plaintiff was doing at the time of the injury in order
to conclude that, as a matter of law, the "ship repairing" provision
ruled out a negligence action. Reversing, Judge Rubin spelled out a
methodology that is very similar to that used in determining seaman
status:
When classifying an employee for purposes of determining whether
a suit under § 905(b) is barred, we look not only at what the
employee was doing at the moment he was injured. We also
look at whether the employee "regularly performs some portion
of what is indisputably [ship-repair] work," or has been assigned
for an appreciable period of time to do "substantial [ship-repair]
work, even though his assignment to it is not 'permanent,"'
just as we do in determining whether he is a longshoreman or,
in Jones Act cases, a member of the crew of a vessel. If the
employee's permanent duties, or his interim duties over an appreciable period, are such that he would be a covered ship
repairerwithin the meaning of [the employee-coverage provision]
of the LHWCA, then he is barredfrom bringing suit against
22
his employer under § 905(b). 1
In the very recent decisions the italicized portion of Judge Rubin's
formulation seems to be gaining favor as a short-hand indication of the
273
necessary inquiry in these cases.
III.

A.

SOME PROBLEMS IN THE GENERAL LAW PROTECTING MARITIME
WORKERS

The Two Faces of the Course-Of-Employment Concept

A seaman who gets hurt or falls ill while in the "service of the
ship ' 274 is entitled to maintenance and cure from the employer. The

270. Id. at 1210.
271. 915 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1990).
272. Id. at 1010 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
273. See Easley v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 936 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1991),
vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 1463, opinion after remand, 965 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting the indicated language in support of upholding summary judgment for defendant).
274. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 525, 71 S. Ct. 432, 434 (1951) (quoting

Shipowners' Liability Convention, Art. 2, § 2(a), 54 Stat. 1693 (1939)).
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Supreme Court has defined "service of the ship" very broadly; it includes
all of the seaman's work activities and duties as well as authorized shore
leave and the like. 275 A seaman who is hurt "in the course of his
276
employment" can sue his employer for negligence under the Jones Act.
The Supreme Court has held that "the term 'course of employment'
under the [Jones) Act .. .is the equivalent of the 'service of the ship'
formula used in maintenance and cure cases. '"277 The course-of-employment vocabulary thus takes a very broad meaning when used to describe
the required relationship between the employer and the Jones Act plaintiff at the time of the injury. For example, a seaman hurt on shore
leave who could establish that the injury resulted from his employer's
negligence would be entitled to recovery.
An analytical problem arises because the identical term, "course of
the employment," is also routinely used in a quite different sense, to
describe the required relationship between the employer and an employee
whose negligence is asserted as the basis for vicarious liability. Courts
sometimes seem to assume that this vicarious liability course-of-employment concept in Jones Act cases necessarily takes the same broad
definition as the course of employment/service of ship concept discussed
in the preceding paragraph. 278 The assumption is unfortunate. Consider
the case of two blue water sailors ashore in a port city on authorized
leave. They go upon a dance hall balcony overlooking a sharp dropoff
to rocks below. One negligently trips, causing the other to fall from
the balcony. Under binding Supreme Court authority, the injured worker
was in the service of the ship 279 and therefore in the course of his
employment. 2 0 Should these conclusions automatically entail the conclusion that the negligent sailor was in the course of his employment
so as to make the employer vicariously liable for his negligence under
the Jones Act? Surely the better answer is no. The injured sailor should
have maintenance and cure, but there is no tenable basis for holding
the employer vicariously liable for employee negligence in these circumstances.

275.
276.
277.

See Warren, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S. Ct. 432.
46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988).
Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129, 132-33, 80 S. Ct. 247, 249-50

(1959).
278. See, e.g., Guidry v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 850 (W.D. La.
1977), rev'd in part on other grounds and criticized, 614 F.2d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 1980);
Daughdrill v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 305 F. Supp. 836, 837, 840 (W.D.La. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.
Ct. 1261 (1972). But cf. Moore v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 468 F.2d 815, 816
(5th Cir. 1972) (concluding tortfeasor employee not within course of employment and
pretermitting question of whether identically situated plaintiff was).
279. See Warren, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct. 432.
280. See Braen, 361 U.S. 129, 80 S.Ct. 247.
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A related problem has arisen with some frequency in the Fifth
Circuit. Consider the case of two offshore drilling barge workers travelling in the same automobile while returning to work after a few days
off. From one point of view they are returning from shore leave. Suppose
the driver's negligence causes injury to the passenger, who then seeks
maintenance and cure and Jones Act damages from the employer. The
court must first determine if the plaintiff/passenger was in the service
of the ship/course of the employment. Would an affirmative answer
automatically mean that the driver was also in the course of his employment so as to make the employer vicariously liable for his negligent
driving? Some of the judges who have considered this problem have
assumed yes, 21 and it may well be that this assumption was one of the
reasons the Fifth Circuit eventually held in Daughdrill v. Diamond M.
Drilling Co.2" 2 that such workers are not to be regarded as in the service
of the ship. The conclusion is debatable. A fairer and more humane
response to the situation would seemingly have been to allow the injured
passenger maintenance and cure but to deny Jones Act recovery. Recognition that the course-of-employment concept has two faces would
have made that response easy to achieve. The court could have held
that in their status as victims or potential victims, the two workers were
in the service of the ship/course of the employment, but that they were
not in the course of the employment in the sense necessary to make
their actions count as those of the employer for purposes of vicarious
liability.
Judge Rubin addressed the two faces of the course-of-employment
concept in a related context in Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors,
Inc.2"' Pointing out that the district judge in that case had evidently
assumed that the plaintiff-employer relationship issue and the vicarious
liability issue were "governed by the same criteria,''28 Judge Rubin
explained the conceptual mistake and set forth a useful guide for the
vicarious liability determination. To determine whether the worker was
in the course of the employment in the sense necessary for vicarious
liability, one should ask whether "at the moment he was doing the
work that led to [the] injury [the allegedly negligent employee] was
acting in the business of and under the control of [the employerJ. ' ' 8s
If the lawyers or judges who handled the Daughdrill case had had the
benefit of Judge Rubin's Guidry insight and analysis, arguably a better
resolution would have emerged.

281.
282.
283.

See Daughdrill, 305 F. Supp. 836.
Id.
614 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1980).

284. Id. at 455.
285.

Id.
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The Unseaworthiness of Vessels Under Demise Charter

On the traditional view, when a shipowner relinquishes control of
the vessel by demise or bareboat chartering it to another, the owner's
responsibility for maintaining its seaworthiness is terminated. The owner
remains responsible for unseaworthy conditions that existed when the
vessel was turned over to the charterer, and the vessel is liable in rem
for damages caused by unseaworthy conditions (whether arising before
or after the charter). In the case of a seaman personally injured by a
defective condition on a vessel under bareboat charter, unless it can be
established with certainty when the defective condition arose, the traditional structure may force the plaintiff to sue all three entities. If the
defect existed before the charter was made, both the owner and the
bareboat charterer should be liable. But if the defect arose after the
charter, the owner will not be liable. Cautious counsel may fear the
structure has enough loopholes to require adding the vessel as an in
rem defendant wherever possible.
In one of his finest opinions Judge Rubin took aim at the traditional
structure in Baker v. Raymond International,Inc." Observing that the
feature whereby the owner escapes personal liability for injuries caused
by unseaworthy conditions arising after a demise charter often functions
"as a pleading trap for the unwary and as a purely fortuitous means
whereby an owner may escape liability if his vessel is beyond the court's
jurisdiction, 2 87 Judge Rubin for a unanimous panel held that the owner's
liability should not depend on when the defective condition arose: "[A]
seaman may have recourse in personam against the owner of an unseaworthy vessel, without regard to whether owner or bareboat charterer
is responsible for the vessel's condition. 2 8 In reaching this innovative
conclusion Judge Rubin explained that the traditional view was based
on 19th century perceptions of the "political and economic need to
encourage enterprise. ' 28 9 He also stressed the functional tension involved
in holding a vessel liable in rem for matters outside the owner's in
personam liability.
Unfortunately the Baker innovation is not faring especially well in
the jurisprudence to date. Presumably in a technical sense it is the
current law of the Fifth Circuit, 290 and several Fifth Circuit judges have

286. 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. Unit A. Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S.
Ct. 2256 (1982).
287. Id. at 184.
288. Id.
289. Id.at 183.
290. But see Deal v. A. P. Bell Fish Co., 674 F.2d 438, 440 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)
("question of an owner's liability for unseaworthy conditions arising after the commencement of a charter is unsettled in this Circuit .... ).
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paid lip service to it in cases in which it was not decisive. 29' But the
Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly said that it "is contrary to the
great weight of federal case law, and we decline to follow it. "292 And
courts in other circuits have continued to state the traditional view,
often without indicating any awareness of Baker.293 It is perhaps too
early to tell what the upshot will be. It is hoped that, once awareness
of Judge Rubin's Baker opinion spreads, the plausibility of the views
expressed there will come to be accepted.
C. Damages For Failure to Provide Maintenance and Cure
The Supreme Court's decision in Vaughan v. Atkinson294 reaffirmed 29
that a seaman's employer who fails to furnish maintenance and cure
can be liable for damages, including such items as medical and related
expenses and pain and suffering. Vaughan also made some new law,
holding that such damages can include attorney's fees when the employer's failure to meet the maintenance and cure obligation was "cal96
lous," "willful," and "persistent.' '2
The Vaughan opinion was cryptic; it left many questions unanswered
and for more than two decades caused a great deal of confusion. 297 The
jurisprudence following Vaughan did not achieve clarity as to the standard of blameworthiness necessary to support an award of compensatory
damages nor as to whether punitive damages in addition to attorney's
fees may be awarded on an appropriate showing. In 1987 Judge Rubin
turned the laser beam of his analytical power on the confusion and, at
least for the Fifth Circuit, cut it away. His opinion in Morales v.
Garijak, Inc. 298 sets forth a clear conceptual structure that is consistent
with the apparent meaning of Vaughan and that completely rationalizes
the entire matter: (1) When the employer fails to furnish maintenance
and cure and the seaman must go to court to compel payment, main-

291. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1383 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L.
Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 966, 102 S. Ct.
2263 (1982).
292. Backhus v. Transit Casualty Co., 549 So. 2d 283, 292 (La. 1989).
293. See, e.g., Dante & Russell, Inc. v. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 877 F.2d
1404, 1406, superseded on other grounds, 895 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Once the demise
charter is perfected, the owner is relieved of its obligations for the term of the charter;
liability for the contracts and torts of the master, crew, and vessel falls upon the charterer

and upon the vessel in rem. .. ").
294. 369 U.S. 527, 82 S. Ct. 997 (1962).
295. See also Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 53 S. Ct. 173 (1932).
296. Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 530-31, 82 S. Ct. at 999.
297. See Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 311-14 (2d
ed. 1975).
298. 829 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1987).
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tenance and cure will be awarded on a showing that it was due. But
on that showing alone nothing more is due from the employer. "[A]
shipowner who is in fact liable for maintenance and cure, but who has
been reasonable in denying liability, may be held liable only for the
amount of maintenance and cure. ' " (2) If the employee makes the
further showing that the employer's failure to pay was negligent or
unreasonable-" [i]f the shipowner has refused to pay without a reasonable defense"3 -the employer owes compensatory damages. "These
are the damages that have resulted from the failure to pay, such as the
aggravation of the seaman's condition, determined by the usual principles
applied in tort cases to measure compensatory damages." ' 30' (3) "If the
shipowner, in failing to pay maintenance and cure, has not only been
unreasonable but has been more egregiously at fault, he will be liable
for punitive damages and attorney's fees. We have described this higher
degree of fault in such terms as callous and recalcitrant, arbitrary and
' '3 2
capricious, or willful, callous, and persistent. 0
D.

Retaliatory Firing

A seaman who signs on for a particular voyage or for a specific
term of employment has some traditional maritime law protections against
wrongful discharge.3 0 3 But a seaman hired without any contractual arrangement as to the term of employment has traditionally been subject
to being fired at will. In Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service'04 Judge
Rubin sought to modify that situation by establishing a maritime tort
action on behalf of a seaman fired in retaliation for filing a Jones Act
claim. Finding no guidance in the maritime law precedents, Judge Rubin
looked to "the nonmaritime common law"30 for assistance. There he
found a large body of precedent and controversy centering on what has
come to be known as the employment-at-will doctrine, whereby an
employer can generally fire an employee with no contractual right to
continued employment for "good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.''30, Judge

299.

Id. at 1358.

300.
301.

Id.
Id.

302. Id. (emphasis supplied).
303. See Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1060 & n.2 (5th
Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981), and authorities cited there. See also Stetson v. S/V Sea Cloud,
673 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Mass. 1987).
304. 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981).
305. Id. at 1060.
306. Id. (quoting Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will Vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405
(1967) (quoting Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 510-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915))).
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Rubin pointed out that this harsh doctrine "was not inherited from the
English common law, but originated in this country. It can be traced
to an 1877 American treatise on master-servant relations. 3' 0 7 He found
that the better-reasoned modern cases recognize a public policy exception
to the at-will doctrine; it is "an abuse of the employer's absolute right
to terminate the employment relationship when the employer utilizes
that right to contravene an established public policy.' '308
"[I]n light of the admiralty court's protective attitude toward the
seaman," 3°9 Judge Rubin concluded that the public policy exception
should certainly be extended to prohibit firing a worker for filing a
Jones Act claim. "The judiciary's leading role in fashioning controlling
rules of maritime law and in reshaping old doctrines to meet changing
conditions makes the admiralty court peculiarly sensitive to the inequities
inherent in the traditional [employment-at-will] rule." 31 0 Judge Rubin
was careful to indicate the boundaries of the newly-created maritime
tort:
The maritime employer may discharge the seaman for good
cause, for no cause, or even, in most circumstances, for a
morally reprehensible cause. We conclude, however, that a discharge in retaliation for the seaman's exercise of his legal right
to file a personal injury action against the employer constitutes
a maritime tort...
In order to prevail on the retaliatory discharge claim, the seaman
must affirmatively establish that the employer's decision was
motivated in substantial part by the knowledge that the seaman
either intends to file, or has already filed, a personal injury
action against the employer."'
He went on to hold that an employee who succeeds in meeting that
burden can recover compensatory damages, including the expenses of
finding a new job, lost earnings, and damages for mental anguish,312
but that punitive damages should not be allowed.
Smith has been cited as part of a "broadside attack in recent years
made upon the idea of at will termination of employment contracts," 3' 3
but to date the Smith cause of action has been fairly narrowly confined

307.

Id. at 1060 n.3 (citations omitted).

308.
309.

Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1063.

310.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

311. Id. at 1063-64 (footnotes omitted).
312. Smith has been cited with some frequency in support of emotional distress damages
in successful retaliatory discharge cases. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d
692, 700 (W. Va. 1982).
313. Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 253 & n.1 (Miss. 1985).
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by the courts. Smith has been held to furnish no support for a general
federal-law "whistleblower" cause of action. 1 4 In cases in which railroad
workers allege they have been fired for instituting FELA31 5 suits, the
influence of Smith has been limited by the view that the Railway Labor
Act3' 1 6 may preclude tort-law remedies for retaliatory firings of railroad
workers a 7 In the maritime realm, some courts have held that the Smith
cause of action is confined to seamen;"' on this view other maritime
workers seeking relief for retaliatory firings must look to the provisions
of the LHWCA 19 or to state law.3 20 Nor does Smith establish a general
negligence action for any wrongful discharge of a seaman. 32' For example,
the courts have read Smith as furnishing no support for a seaman's
assertion of a maritime tort claim for age discrimination, pointing out
that the Smith cause of action is "specifically limited to situations in
which a seaman is discharged in retaliation for seeking to enforce an
3 22
already existing right under maritime law.1
On the other hand, grudging readings of Smith-such as one district
judge's "hair-line distinction ... between firing someone for filing a
personal injury suit and firing him for the allegations of his complaint"have been rejected.3 23 And the Sixth Circuit has potentially broadened
Smith by holding that a worker *vhose collective bargaining contract
protects him from causeless dismissal may choose to forgo the grievance
procedures set forth in the contract and go directly to court with a tort

314.
315.

See Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Says. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 759 n.7 (5th Cir. 1987).
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).

316. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988).
317. Whether such actions are in fact preempted seems to be unsettled at present.
Compare Landfried v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 721 F.2d 254, 256 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 928, 104 S.Ct. 1712 (1984) (distinguishing Smith because
"the preclusive effect of the RLA was not at issue" there) with Merchant v. American
S.S. Co., 860 F.2d 204, 207-09 (6th Cir. 1988) (suggesting railway workers' retaliatory
discharge suits are not preempted by the RLA). See also Dibble v. Grand Trunk W. R.R.
Co., 699 F. Supp. 123, 127 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ("a state law claim for retaliatory discharge
may not be preempted by the RLA").
318. See Ardleigh v. Schlumberger Ltd., 832 F.2d 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1987). But see
Roberie v. Gulf Oil Corp., 545 F. Supp. 298, 300 (W.D. La. 1982) (dictum suggestion
that maritime workers other than seamen may use Smith as basis for retaliatory firing
suits).
319. See Buchanan v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 750, 752 (5th.Cir. 1984).
Section 948a of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 948(a) (1988), sets up a penalty of $1000 to
$5000 for firing a LHWCA worker in retaliation for claiming compensation.
320. Buchanan, 741 F.2d at 752 & n.2.
321. See Tate v. Overseas Bulktane Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
322. Belanger v. Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 826 (E.D; La. 1984), aff'd without
opinion, 772 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1985).
323. Roberson v. Rebstock Drilling Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 1182, 1182 (5th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam reversal by a panel consisting of Judges Rubin, Tate, and Hill of a ruling
by District Judge Peter Beer). Cf. Beer, supra note 4.
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action.324 "The common law has recognized for centuries that a plaintiff
may waive a tort and sue in assumpsit, and admiralty law, which has
always shown particular solicitude for the seaman, presumably would
not bar the converse procedure without some good reason for doing
'
SO. 325 In reaching that decision, the Sixth Circuit concluded that federal
labor law does not preempt the seaman's maritime tort action under
Smith.326

The most serious and debatable restriction on the reach of the Smith
cause of action occurred in the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Feemster
v. BJ-Titan Services Co./Titan Services, Inc. ,327 in which the court
concluded that "the Smith court expressly limited its holding to its own
facts. ' 328 The seaman/plaintiff in Feemster was a tugboat captain who
was fired for refusing to take an eighteen-hour nonstop trip that would
have violated a federal safety statute limiting vessel operations to twelve
hours in a twenty-four hour period.3 29 Upholding summary judgment
dismissing his retaliatory firing suit, the Fifth Circuit panel took the
view that the seaman had no right to resist violating the safety statute
and could therefore be fired for doing S0.330 The opinion suggests that
the seaman should have either complained to the Coast Guard about
the proposed trip33' or perhaps stared on the trip and then refused to
continue past the twelve-hour point(!), 32 Being fired for either of these
his "argument
actions, the court suggested, would have strengthened
333
that his discharge contravened public policy.

In addition to the substantive difficulty involved in the foregoing
cases, the retaliatory discharge tort action also entails some jurisdictional
difficulties. Judge Rubin resolved one potential difficulty in Smith: "The
324. Merchant v. American S.S. Co., 860 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1988).
325. Id. at 207 (footnotes omitted).
326. See id. at 204, 207-08 (discussing provisions of § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988)).
327. 873 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1989).
328. Id. at 92.
329. 46 U.S.C.A. § 8104(h) (West Supp. 1991).
330. The 4th Circuit has followed Feemster in a case involving virtually identical facts.
Meaige v. Hartley Marine Corp., 925 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2826
(1991). See also Garrie v. James L. Gray, Inc., 912 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1108 (1991) (following Feemster).
331. Feemster, 873 F.2d at 93-94.
332. "[Tjhis dispute never ripened to the extent that it can support a claim of retaliatory
discharge for his refusal to commit an unlawful act. Feemster simply interposed his
judgment against that of management that a safety violation would occur if he made the
trip and he refused the assignment. He was discharged for that refusal. Feemster never
embarked on his journey and there was no violation of law. Whether the law would have
been violated is speculative. Thus, because the discharge arose in the absence of a clear
requirement by management that Feemster violate the statute, it is difficult to characterize
this as a retaliation that offends public policy." Id. at 94.
333. Id.
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claim for retaliatory discharge may be joined with the seaman's personal
injury action [on the law side of federal court] under the Jones Act
and, like the general maritime law cause of action for unseaworthiness,
may be tried to the jury along with the Jones Act claim even in the
absence of diversity. 33 4 But can the retaliatory discharge claims be
brought to federal court on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction? Generally
speaking, admiralty jurisdiction in tort requires both "locality"-the
injury must occur on navigable water or be caused by a vessel on
navigable water-and a "maritime nexus"-the circumstances of the tort
must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.335
Obviously the retaliatory firing cases cannot satisfy the locality requirement. Equally obviously, a way should be found to permit federal
admiralty courts to hear them; surely it is undebatable that admiralty
courts should be the ones to work out the contours of the maritime
substantive law's protection of seamen who have been subjected to
retaliatory firing.336 One way to accomplish the desired result would be
to conclude that some torts have so much "maritime nexus" or "maritime flavor" that locality is not required. 3 7 Another would be to build
33
on the doctrine of O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
whereby the Jones Act furnishes an independent basis for admiralty
jurisdiction; it could be held that other actions by seamen against their
employers asserting violations of the employer-employee relationship come
under the O'Donnell jurisdictional umbrella. The matter requires attention. In several of the above-discussed cases the courts evidently assumed
the existence of admiralty jurisdiction without thinking about the matter.339
In one of them the court said there was no admiralty jurisdiction but
then proceeded to apply its view of the substantive maritime tort law
(in interpreting the controlling Louisiana statute) as if there were no
jurisdictional difficulty.314 And in one case the court dismissed for lack

334. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.
1981) (footnotes omitted).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 234-237.
336. See Buchanan v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing a retaliatory discharge claim for lack of admiralty jurisdiction on "locality"
grounds).
337. This excellent suggestion is made (and unfortunately then apparently rejected) in
Maraist, supra note 14, at 38. See also Roberie v. Gulf Oil Corp., 545 F. Supp. 298,
300 (W.D. La. 1982) ("Retaliatory discharge of a maritime employee should be viewed
as a maritime tort, regardless of where the employee receives his proverbial 'pink slip."').
338. 318 U.S. 36, 63 S. Ct. 488 (1943).
339. See, e.g., Meaige v. Hartley Marine Corp., 925 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 2826 (1991); Feemster v. BJ-Titan Servs. Co./Titan Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 91
(5th Cir. 1989); Tate v. Overseas Bulktane Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Tex. 1985),
aff'd, 786 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172 (1986).
340. See Belanger v. Keydril Co., 596 F. Supp. 823, 824-25 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd
without opinion, 772 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1985).
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when a decision
of subject matter jurisdiction on "locality" grounds
34'
preferable.
been
have
clearly
would
merits
the
on
E.

Fatal Injuries

When a maritime worker is fatally injured his survivors may maintain
a wrongful death action seeking to recover their own losses. The worker's
estate may maintain a survival action seeking to recover the losses the
worker himself sustained and could have asserted had he lived. The
American maritime law has had no end of trouble with both types of
actions. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Miles v. Apex Marine
42-affirming Judge Rubin's decision in Miles v. Melrose34 3Corporationa
brings a great deal of needed clarification. It does so by significantly
narrowing maritime workers' tort rights.
1. Survival Actions
"In a survival action, the estate or successors of a deceased person
are allowed to prosecute a claim for personal injury that the deceased
himself would have had but for his death." 3" Such an action was not
permitted at common law or early American maritime law, both of
which "followed the rule that personal tort actions died with the
plaintiff. 3 4 Virtually everywhere the old common law rule has been
abrogated by survival statutes. But for maritime fatalities the statutory
coverage is 'incomplete. The Jones Act's survival provision is limited to
negligence actions against the employers of deceased seamen. 3

No gen-

341. See Buchanan v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1984).
342. 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
343. 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., IIl
S. Ct. 317 (1990). Judge Rubin's Miles decision is important for several reasons in addition
to those discussed in the text. It held: (1) A seaman who stabbed a fellow crew member
62 times in a frenzied attack was violent beyond the ordinary standards of the calling,
making the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law. See Miles, 882 F.2d at 981-83. (2)
The chief steward's tolerating the attacker's drinking, "while perhaps negligent, is not
the type of outrageous conduct that justifies imposing punitive damages" under the general
maritime law. Id. at 989. (3) A claim that the union knew the man had a violent history
and supplied him to the ship without warning states a cause of action in maritime tort
that is not preempted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1988). See Miles, 882 F.2d at 989-93.
344. Miles, 882 F.2d at 985.
345. Id. Early common law and early maritime law also took the view that the death
of the tortfeasor abated any remedy. In one of his last opinions as a district judge, Judge
Rubin explained that the modern maritime law has implicitly rejected the abatement rule
and explicitly held that personal injury and fatal injury claims survive the death of the
tortfeasor. McKeithen v. M/T Frosta, 435 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. La. 1977). This decision
is generally regarded as indisputably correct. See Maraist, supra note 14, at 286-87.
346. See Maraist, supra note 14, at 278.
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eral statute addresses maritime fatalities occurring within a marine league
from shore. The Death on the High Seas Act3 47 covers all maritime
fatalities occurring beyond a marine league from shore but does not
3
include a survival provision.
48 Thus, as to fatal injury situations not
encompassed by the Jones Act, early maritime courts wishing to allow
survival actions had to look to state survival statutes.
The Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines 49 established a general maritime law action for wrongful death
but did not address the question of survival actions. Nevertheless, as
Judge Rubin explained in Miles v. Melrose:
After Moragne.... numerous decisions of this and other circuits
have recognized that, under the principles announced in that
decision, the general maritime law includes a survival action
permitting recovery for a victim's pre-death pain and suffering.
Following the rationale of Moragne, which looked to the proliferation of state wrongful death acts to find that such an action
had become part of our general law, courts reasoned that a
survival action for pain and suffering should be recognized as
well, since the Jones Act and almost all states allow such survival
actions. 5 0
Affirming Judge Rubin's decision, the Supreme Court in its Miles opinion
engaged in an excess of caution by stating that it would "decline to
address the issue""'' whether the general maritime law includes a survival
remedy. However, the overwhelming weight of the lower court jurisprudence-taken together with the tenor of the Supreme Court's Miles
opinion-makes it apparent that the general maritime law recognizes
survival actions. It is regrettable that the Court did not come right out
and say so, but any remaining debate on the matter will seem highly
academic.
The difficult survival issue in Miles v. Melrose-an issue of first
impression for the Fifth Circuit 3 2-was
whether recovery at general
maritime law on behalf of the estate of a deceased seaman can include
the seaman's lost future earnings. Had the lawsuit been based entirely
on allegations of employer negligence, the Jones Act survival provision
would clearly have precluded the future earnings claim. But the Miles
plaintiff also had a claim based on the unseaworthiness of the vessel
and governed by general maritime law. The Ninth Circuit had held that

347. 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (1988).
348. See Maraist, supra note 14, at 284-85.
349. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
350. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 986 (5th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nor. Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
351. Miles, 111 S. Ct. at 327.
352. Miles, 882 F.2d at 985.
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the general maritime law survival action will allow recovery for lost
future earnings.353 Judge Rubin disagreed, pointing out that the general
understanding of survival actions limits them to losses sustained by the
decedent himself up to the moment of death and that neither the Jones
Act survival provision nor most state survival statutes allows recovery
for lost future earnings. 54 Unanimously 3" affirming, the Supreme Court
laid down a broad rule: "We ... hold that a general maritime survival
3 56
action cannot include recovery for decedent's lost future earnings.
The Court's reasoning makes it fairly clear that all maritime fatalitiesnot just those involving seamen-are covered by its ruling.
2.

Wrongful Death Actions

The early general maritime law followed the early common law in
refusing to recognize a cause of action for wrongful death.357 Maritime
35
courts therefore looked to wrongful death statutes-the Jones Act, ,
the Death on the High Seas Act, 3 9 and state statutes-as a basis for
allowing some recovery to the survivors of deceased maritime workers.
The Supreme Court greatly simplified matters in the 1970 Moragne
decision 3' 6 by recognizing a general maritime law-i.e., non-statutorycause of action for wrongful death. Since the Moragne decision it has
become reasonably clear that resort to state death statutes is no longer
appropriate in maritime cases. 36' This leaves the Jones Act, the Death
on the High Seas Act, and the general maritime law remedy recognized
in Moragne as the only potential sources of recovery in maritime wrongful death actions.
There is significant variety among legal systems as to the categories
of losses for which wrongful death recovery should be awarded. Typically
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover their pecuniary losses-loss of support, loss of services, and often funeral expenses-but there is great
disagreement over the propriety of allowing recovery for what is variously
called loss of consortium, loss of companionship, and loss of society.
The Moragne opinion discussed this question and stated that its resolution

353. Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S. Ct.
261 (1987).
354. Miles, 882 F.2d at 986-87.
355. Justice Souter did not participate.
356. Miles, 111 S. Ct. at 328.
357. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140 (1886).
358. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988) extends the FELA wrongful death action to seamen's
survivors.
359. 46 U.S.C. § 761 etseq. (1988).
360. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772 (1970).
361. See Maraist, supra note 14, at 285-86.
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should be left to later decisions. 362 Four years later in Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet3 63 a closely divided Court announced that the wrongful
death action under general maritime law allows recovery for loss of
society.
Neither the Jones Act nor the Death on the High Seas Act permits
recovery for loss of society. The jurisprudence since Gaudet has been
struggling to accommodate the disparity between these statutes' restriction
to pecuniary loss and the Gaudet Court's allowance of loss of society
recovery as a matter of general maritime law. Case by case, the Gaudet
principle has been eroding. First the Supreme Court held that no maritime death occurring within the coverage of the Death on the High
Seas Act-i.e., beyond a marine league from shore-gives rise to a cause
of action for loss of society. 3" Next, in Judge Rubin's decision in Ivy
v. Security Barge Lines,3 6 the Fifth Circuit held that loss of society
recovery is unavailable in negligence actions against the employers of
deceased seamen. The Supreme Court has stated that the Ivy holding
was correct. 3"6 Finally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Miles v.
Apex Corporation367 holds that loss of society recovery is unavailable
3
in all actions based on the death of seamen. 6
If the foregoing discussion is correct, loss of society damages are
unavailable in all actions for death beyond a marine league from shore
and in all actions for the death of seamen. In what kinds of maritime
wrongful death actions, then, may loss of society be compensated? On
the basis of the principles discussed above and the Miles holding, one
could say that loss of society recovery remains available in actions based
on the death of a nonseaman occurring within a marine league from
shore. However, there is language in the Supreme Court's Miles opinion
indicating an even narrower answer: "The holding of Gaudet ...applies

362. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 406-08, 90 S. Ct. at 1790-91.
363. 414 U.S. 573, 90 S. Ct. 806 (1974).
364. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 2010 (1978)

(general maritime law action for death beyond a marine league does not allow recovery
for loss of society); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485
(1986) (state death statutes-some of which allow
apply to deaths occurring beyond a marine league
365. 585 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1978) (Rubin, J.),
(en banc) (Rubin, J.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956,

recovery for loss of society-cannot
from shore).
aff'd, 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979)
100 S.Ct. 2927 (1980).

366. "There is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act wrongful death action."
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., Ill S. Ct. 317, 325 (1990).
367. Miles, Ill S. Ct. 317.
368. Judge Rubin's denial of loss of society recovery was limited to nondependent
relatives of seamen. See Miles, 882 F.2d at 989. The Supreme Court's holding is broader,
covering all actions for the death of seamen: "We hold that there is a general maritime
cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman, but that damages recoverable in
such an action do not include loss of society." Miles, 111 S.Ct. at 328.
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only to longshoremen." 36 9 On that view, loss of society recovery will
be rare. It will be restricted to surviving relatives (probably only those
who were financially dependent on the deceased) of LHWCA workers
killed in territorial waters (i.e., within a marine league) under circumstances giving rise to recovery under the limitations imposed by the
Scindia' 70 and May171 lines of cases. Given the narrowness of what
remains of Gaudet, it seems likely that in the next few years loss of
society recovery will be eliminated altogether from the law governing
maritime fatalities.
F. Loss of Society Damages In Non-Fatal Cases
In American Export Lines v. Alvez 72 the Supreme Court held that
the wife of an LHWCA worker injured nonfatally in state territorial
waters could maintain an action for damages for loss of her husband's
society. Judge Rubin thereafter wrote three opinions working out the
implications of Alvez. In Cruz v. Hendy International Co. a73 he held
that the wife of a seaman hurt by unseaworthiness in territorial waters
had a similar right. But, he made clear, no such right would exist for
the wife of a seaman hurt by Jones Act negligence; the Jones Act rules
37
3 74
out non-pecuniary recoveries. In Overstreet v. Water Vessel Norkong
Judge Rubin discussed without deciding whether the children of a seaman
hurt by unseaworthiness can sue for loss of society. 76 And in Madore
v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc.37 7 he held that a seaman's children have no
cause of action for loss of society in non-fatal cases and intimated a
broader principle,8 that children cannot recover for losing the society of
a living parent.1
It seems almost certain that recovery for loss of society in non-fatal
379
injury cases will prove to be no more extensive than in fatality cases.
In light of the current restrictions on such recovery in death cases,
probably injuries beyond a marine league cannot give rise to a right to
recover for lost society, and probably neither can injuries to a seaman.

369. Miles, 111 S. Ct. at 325.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 223-232.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 240-244.
372. 446 U.S. 274, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
373. 638 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
374. Id. at 723. See also Madore v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc., 732 F.2d 475, 479 (5th
Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J.).
375. 706 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1983).
376. Id. at 645.
377. 732 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1984).
378. Id.at 479.
379. The Alvez Court derived the right to recover for lost society in non-fatality cases
from Gaudet's recognition of it in fatality cases. See American Export Lines v. Alvez,
446 U.S. 274, 281, 100 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1980).
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On this view Judge Rubin's decision in Cruz was implicitly overruled
by Miles3 s0 In other words, decisions allowing such recovery in nonfatal cases beyond the narrow confines of Alvez itself are probably no
longer good law. Alvez involved the wife of an LHWCA worker hurt
in territorial water. The tiny remnant of the Gaudet principle that clings
to life after Miles is also confined to the families of LHWCA workers
and to territorial water. And if Judge Rubin was right in Madore, only
spouses, and no other family members, would be allowed to sue for
lost society in non-fatality cases. Giving the right to recover for lost
society to this smallish group of plaintiffs while denying it to all other
maritime plaintiffs, including the "wards of the admiralty""'' and their
families, is too strange a distinction to subsist for long. Thus, it seems
probable that loss of society damages will disappear from the maritime
law in the relatively near future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Judge Rubin's contributions to maritime law are so extensive and
pervasive that any selection of subtopics is virtually guaranteed to omit
some important matters. Knowledgeable readers will doubtless remark
the omission of Culver v. Slater Boat Co."2 as well as other important
Rubin opinions dealing with damages issues.383 Many Louisiana lawyers
will wonder how I managed to ignore District Judge Rubin's herculean
efforts in the massive McKeithen v. MIT Frosta litigation.3 8 Lawyers
with international outlooks will note my failure to treat important opinions by Judge Rubin on transnational choice-of-law38 5 and forum non

380. As this article was going to press decisions stating that Miles implicitly overruled
Cruz began to appear. See, e.g., Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Constr. Co., 958 F.2d
127 (5th Cir.) petition for cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. July 15, 1992) (No. 92103); Michel v. Total Transportation, 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992).
381. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 355, 91 S. Ct. 409, 411
(1971).
382. 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Culver IF') (en banc), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252, 104 S. Ct. 3537 (1984), 469 U.S. 819, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984) (setting forth method
for calculating awards for lost earnings).
383. See, e.g., Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975)
(lucid explanation of theretofore puzzling Fifth Circuit rule prohibiting prejudgment interest
in Jones Act cases tried to juries).
384. See 435 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. La. 1977), discussed supra in note 345; 435 F. Supp.
572 (E.D. La. 1977) (personal jurisdiction over foreign maritime liability insurer); 426 F.
Supp. 307 (E.D. La. 1977) (mass tort litigation management issues). See Paul M. Haygood,
An Interview With Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 39 La. B.J. 169, 170 (1991) (Judge Rubin
citing McKeithen as the case he most remembered presiding over as district judge).
385. See Fogleman v. Aramco (Arabian American Oil Co.), 920 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that Saudi Arabian law governed suit by American worker injured on
platform off the the shore of Saudi Arabia).

1584

4LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

conveniens s6 questions. Students of comparative fault systems may regret
my decision not to analyze Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc. ' s in
which Judge Rubin explained why old rules of tort indemnity between
co-tortfeasors on the basis of concepts of active and passive negligence
cannot survive in a modern thoroughgoing comparative fault system.
And everyone with litigation experience in the field is likely to note
that I have not discussed Judge Rubin's significant treatments of issues
such as the borrowed servant doctrine,"' the applicability of the Louisiana direct action statute, 3s9 and a host of important procedural issues. 9°
In response to these real and imagined critics I can only say that
I have tried to use the time and space available for this undertaking
to the best advantage as I conscientiously see it. Perhaps it is best to
consider this article a beginning installment. In all likelihood all of us
who work with the maritime law in practical operation will be talking
and writing about Judge Rubin's contributions for many years to come.

386. See Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1984)
(reversing forum non conveniens dismissal of action by relatives of Taiwanese sailors who
died in a collision between Liberian and Greek vessels in Mediterranean).
387. 670 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1982).
388. See Doucet v. Gulf Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 518, 522-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 883, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986) (borrowed employee issues in LHWCA context); Baker
v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 177-79 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983,
102 S. Ct. 2256 (1982) (borrowed servant doctrine in seamen's cases). See supra text
accompanying notes 286-93 for treatment of another aspect of the Baker decision.
389. See Koesler v. Harvey Applicators, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. La. 1976)
(reluctantly bowing to 5th Circuit precedent and concluding that the direct action statute
did not apply to a case involving a fixed platform on the Outer Continental Shelf even
though the cause of action was based on the Jones Act).
390. See, e.g., Tate v. American Tugs, Inc., 634 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1981) (tackling
"novel question" whether an injured seaman awaiting trial can get a preliminary injunction
to increase maintenance payments and answering no in absence of unusual circumstances).

